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"Shaken or Stirred?"

Ontological In-/Security and Turkey's Counterterrorism Narration Between November 2015 and May 2016[1]

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> They are trying to create a cocktail terror in Turkey,
> DAESH, PKK and [the] Parallel [Structure/FETÖ] have a finger in terrorist acts.[3]
>
> (Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 15.10.2015; BBC Türkce 2015)

1. Introduction

In the years of 2015 and 2016, the Republic of Turkey was in a stirring sociopolitical and security turmoil, so that the ruling Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* AKP) was shaken by domestic and international critique. Due to an inability of the parliamentary parties to form a coalition from the results of the 7 June 2015 elections, snap elections were held on the 1st of November the same year. Economically, growth rates remained lower than in previous years (2.5%), the Turkish Lira devalued heavily and the Consumer Confidence Index declined to levels by-then last seen in the 2009 financial crisis (The German Marshall Fund 2015, 1). Simultaneously, Turkey by-then hosted 1.7 million refugees from Syria (ibid.) and witnessed 24 terror attacks conducted by Daesh[4] as well as the 'Kurdistan Workers' Party' (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK) and its (alleged) affiliates the 'Kurdistan Freedom Falcons' (*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan*, TAK).[5]

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[3] Own translation of Turkish original "Türkiye'de kokteyl bir terör oluşturmaya çalışıyorlar. DAEŞ, PKK ve Paralel yapının terör eylemlerinde parmağı var" (BBC Türkce 2015).

[4] 'Daesh' is an Arabic acronym for *al-Dawla al-Islameyah wa al-Sham* also known as 'the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL) and 'Islamic State' (IS).

[5] In addition, Turkey views the 'Democratic Union Party' (*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*, PYD) and the 'People's Protection Units' (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*, YPG) as being directly linked to the PKK, even though the organizations themselves continuously deny their collaboration.

To illustrate, on 10 October 2015, two suicide bombers conducted the deadliest attack in Turkey's history at a protest held in Ankara, which left more than 100 people dead and around 500 wounded (The New York Times 2017). The crowd protested against the growing violence and governmental curfew practices during its fight against 'separatist terrorists' in Southeast Anatolia. While all international analysts pointed towards Daesh as the only possible culprit, then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu claimed that a conspiratorial 'terror cocktail' that also includes the PKK and the so-called 'Parallel Structure' (a.k.a. Gülen Movement a.k.a. *Fethullahcı Terör Örgütü*, FETÖ) (BBC Türkce 2015; NYT 2017). Just ten days before the snap elections on 22 October 2015, the by-then and still incumbent Turkish head of state, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, confirmed the existence of a "medley of mutually antagonistic entities" (Hürriyet Daily News 2015b) and urged the country to 'vote for security and stability' which would be provided by the AKP only.

This study will investigate how President Erdoğan explains and justifies Turkey's counterterrorism approach in the period of the 64th cabinet that forms under Prime Minister Davutoğlu the said snap elections on 1 November 2015. It focuses on arguments surrounding the fights and practices of the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlar Kuvetleri*, TSK) in Southeast Anatolia against the PKK and its affiliates.[6] Thereby, I draw from Felix Berenskoetter's (2014) conceptualization of 'biographical narratives' and Jelena Subotić's (2016) adaptation of this concept to Serbia's policy change concerning the Kosovo Question to argue that office holders use hegemonic state narratives of the past to influence regime stability in phases of instability, i.e. Ontological Insecurity, and that, in turn, 'needs of security' are exploited to justify ambiguous policies.

By putting the concepts of '(biographical) narratives' and 'Ontological Insecurity' up front, my point is neither to discuss whether Turkey's counterterrorism approach towards the PKK is right or wrong nor to normalize low intensity intrastate warfare.[7] Rather, what

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[6] In Southeast Anatolia, the by-then (allaged yet disputed) affiliates of the PKK included the 'Kurdistan Freedom Falcons' (*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan*, TAK), the 'Civil Protection Units' (*Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl*, YPS – formerly known as 'Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement' i.e. *Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareket*, YDG-H).

[7] For a critical investigation of the constitutive potential of Ontological Security Studies, see Christopher S. Browning

follows represents an urgent call to understand how and why politicians securitize 'identities' to explain ambiguous policies and shape public opinion towards their respective vision.

My investigation proceeds in seven sections. Section two describes the counterterrorism interventions Turkey adopted in its fight against the PKK and its (alleged) offshoots as well as those measures' domestic and international critique. Section three introduces 'Ontological In-/Security Theory' and 'biographical narratives' as a lens through which to analyze these phenomena and positions this study within their current conceptual debates and frameworks. Section four subsequently outlines the study's means of data collection and data analysis and reflects on their limitations. Section five then provides a 'master narrative' for Turkey's 'biographical narrative' by tracing two themes relevant for contemporary Turkey's counter-/terrorism understanding which are coined as 'The Internal Unity by Integrity Theme' and 'The International Others Theme'. Section six and seven describe and analyze if and how these themes and their sub-elements were used by President Erdoğan between 26 November 2015 and 22 May 2016. Furthermore, section seven discusses the implications of the findings for OST scholarship and provides suggestions for future research. Section nine summarizes and reflects on all findings of this study.

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and Pertti Joenniemi, 2013, "From Fratricide to Security Community: Re-Theorising Difference in the Constitution of Nordic Peace," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 16 (4): 483–513, and Maria Mälksoo, 2015, "'Memory Must Be Defended': Beyond the Politics of Mnemonical Security," *Security Dialogue* 46 (3): 223. For a narratology and 'perspective' window, see Kristen Renwick Monroe, "A Paradigm for Political Psychology," in *Political Psychology*, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002): 399–416. On the co-constitutive potential of International Relations scholarship for world politics, see e.g. Steve Smith, 2004, "Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11", *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (3): 499-515.

2.   Turkey's Counterterrorism Approach Towards the PKK

Map 1: A Map of Turkey's Southeast (Retrieved from: International Crisis Group 2016, 17).

Encouraged by the electoral gains of the pro-Kurdish 'Peoples' Democratic Party' (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, HDP) in the 5 June 2015 elections and the territorial gains of the 'Democratic Union Party' (*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*, PYD) in Syria (*Rojava*) in spring 2015, 16 municipal districts in Southeast Anatolia as well as one neighborhood in Istanbul successively declared their self-management (*öz yönetim*) or autonomy (*özerklik*) throughout August 2015 (Kasapoglu 2015). After PKK affiliated militants dug trenches and built barricades around several areas (Mandiraci 2016; Worth 2016), government-appointed governors (*valiler*) declared states of emergency's in 18 south-eastern towns and districts to ensure government control over these areas (International Crisis Group 2016, 3). Per the International Crisis Group author Berkay Mandıracı, between August 2015 and mid-July 2016 a total of 85 curfews were declared in 33 effected majority Kurdish districts and towns (see Map 1) for that TSK could conduct its 'counter-terrorism' raids (ibid.). Out of the 85 curfews at least 21 were declared in four cities and 15 districts during the period that is

under investigation in this dissertation, from 26 November 2015 through 22 May 2016 (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 2016).

During the curfews that varied in length between a few hours and days to 78 days non-stop in Cizre in Şırnak province and 141 days non-stop in Diyarbakır's Sur district (Human Rights Watch 2016; Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 2016), civilians were told to stay inside their houses for that the TSK and special security forces could conduct raids in - or in governmental language 'clean' – an area from (alleged) PKK offshoots like the 'Kurdistan Freedom Falcons' (*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan*, TAK) and the 'Civil Protection Units' (*Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl*, YPS – formerly known as 'Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement', *Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareket*, YDG-H) (Human Rights Watch 2016). Persons that were found during those curfews on the streets were supposed to be fined with 100 Turkish Lira (US $30) but were actually assumed to be part of the 'terrorists' and "risked being shot at or detained" (Human Rights Watch 2016).

On 22 December 2015, parliamentarians from the government's opposition party, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) the pro-Kurdish HDP and even one deputy from the ruling AKP urged the government to find an approach based on "national consensus in parliament" regarding the fight against the PKK (Hürriyet Daily News 2015g). By May 2017, around 250 civilian casualties, material damages, 350,000 internally displaced civilians, and the fact that ambulances were not passing through to wounded were reported (Mandıracı 2016). The Turkish government claims that it would be the PKK that does not allow ambulances to go through (Camlibel 2016). Furthermore, Human Rights Watch reported that in one of the epicenters of Cizre, Şırnak province, "security forces surrounded three buildings and deliberately and unjustifiably killed about 130 people – among whom were unarmed civilians and injured combatants – trapped in the basements" (Human Rights Watch 2016). Against all criticism, neither Turkish parliamentarians from the HDP or CHP (Republican People's Party), nor human rights organizations could enter curfewed towns for gathering firsthand information concerning the validity of above information (Human Rights Watch 2016; Hürriyet Daily News 2015f; Hürriyet Daily News 2015a).

In a March 2016 report, Crisis Group International (2016, 6, 8) outlines that "competing *narratives* over the conflict" exist that are provided by the Turkish government, on the one side, and members and sympathizers of the Kurdish movement, on the other side. On 24 May 2016, *Hürriyet Daily News* reports based on 'military sources' that since July 2015 a total of 2583 PKK militants have been killed in operations conducted inside and a total of 2366 outside of the country (Hürriyet Daily News 2016z). Human Rights Watch (2016) speaks of "systematic impunity enjoyed by security forces despite widespread violations of the most serious kind including extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and the unlawful destruction of thousands of homes." Furthermore, Turkish media outlets report raids and detentions of (alleged) PKK members throughout the year, particularly after a deadly terror attack in one of the major cities.

In April 2016, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Nils Muižnieks was granted access to Ankara, Istanbul, and Diyarbakır and condemned the curfews as infringements of the Venice Commission's legality requirements. He called for an investigation into the violation of "numerous human rights of a very large civilian population in South-Eastern Turkey" (Council of Europe Portal 2016). Muižnieks suggested the development of "comprehensive schemes for redress and compensation" (ibid.). On 10 May 2016, United Nations Human Rights Chief Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein asked for permission to access the post-curfew region but the government denied him access to the region (United Nations News Service Section 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). Further criticisms arose from the European Parliament and OHCR (United Nations Human Rights Office 2016; Chase Winter 2016).

Although the focus of this study is on Turkey's counterterrorism approach towards the PKK, other sources of criticism relevant for making sense of this study's data analysis approach (see section 5) involve the Turkish state's engagements in Syria. Since 24 July 2015, Turkey is flying airstrikes against camps of organizations they see affiliated to the PKK, the Kurdish PYD as well as the 'People's Protection Units' (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel*, YPG) in northern Syria (BBC News 2016b). Furthermore, shortly before the June 5 elections, in May 2015, the relatively government critical newspaper *Cumhuriyet* leaked video footage that shows lorries belonging to Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (*Milli*

Istihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) carrying weapons into Syrian rebel areas (Humeyra Pamuk and Nick Tattersall 2015). Whilst Prime Minister Davutoğlu and President Erdoğan declared that those were deliveries in support for Turkmens in northern Syria, deputy-Prime Minister Tuğrul Türkeş later denounced these claims. On the opening day of the 64th cabinet, 26 November 2015, a senior AKP spokesperson declares that Turkey's 'humanitarian assistance' will continue towards these ends (Hürriyet Daily News 2015c). In December 2016, Türkeş explained in front of the Turkish parliament that Turkey is doing what is necessary for protecting its security (Cumhuriyet 2015).

On February 1, 2016, the Syrian government accused Turkey for allowing 100 gunmen to cross into northern Syria (BBC News 2016a). On February 13, 2016, Syria called on the United Nations (UN) because Turkey bombed alleged YPG targets in northern Aleppo with heavy artillery (ibid.). Whilst the UN Security Council remained divided, they expressed "concern about the situation" without any documented outcome in form of a resolution or alike (Hürriyet Daily News 2016g). Subsequently, President Erdoğan shelled the UN but also the United States of America (USA) for not criticizing other conflict parties to the Syrian civil war such as PYD and YPG as well (Hürriyet Daily News 2016f). As the PKK is officially already considered a terrorist group by the European Union (EU) and the USA, in the period that will be under closer scrutiny in section 6 Erdoğan continues to urge and criticize members of the international community to add the Kurdish entities in Syria, the YPG and PYD, to the list.

3. Situating Turkey's Counterterrorism Approach in Ontological In-/Security Theory and Narratology

> We will surely overcome this terrorism as *a state and nation*. […] I am making a new mobilization call against terrorism, terrorist organizations and those who want to tame our country through those organizations.
>
> (Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 21.03.2016;
> Hürriyet Daily News 2016a)

> What we call as *terror* is not just an issue about thousands of militants we are facing. It *is Turkey's existential issue*. Regarding this issue, counter-terrorism operations are being carried out seriously. I hope we can get an outcome. But saying 'it will end this day or that day' would be wrong as it would deceive public opinion.
>
> (Turkish deputy-Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş on 06.04.2016,
> Hürriyet Daily News 2016c)

> The Turkish government has repeatedly dismissed any prospect of returning to the 'negotiating' table with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), stating the security forces' ongoing fight against the group was '*a war of survival*.' 'This claim is not reflecting the truth in anyway. The virtual struggle against the terror organization [PKK] is being *conducted with a high level of devoutness*,' Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş said on April 18.
>
> (Turkish deputy-Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş on 18.04.2016;
> Hürriyet Daily News 2016d)

A plethora of scholarship has already investigated the for almost 40 years enduring conflict with the PKK (e.g. Sakallioğlu 1998; Aydınlı 2002; Aydınlı and Ozdag 2003; Aydınlı, Nihat, and Ozcan 2011; Gambetti and Jongerden 2015) and the general case of Turkey's security politics (e.g. Cizre 2003; Aydınlı 2004; Bilgin 2005; Bilgin 2006). When it comes to making sense of the Turkish perspective to any of the post-2009 developments of the so-called

'Kurdish issue'[8], i.e. the Democratic/Kurdish Opening (*Açılım*; 2009-2010), the ceasefire with the PKK (2013-2015), and the resurgence of violence since July 2015, 'Ontological In-/Security Theory' is the most prominently chosen theoretical window. This section will introduce Ontological In-/Security Theory and its current conceptual debates: first in contrast to another (critical) security studies concept that describes a similar phenomenon ('societal security) and then second with regards to the role of 'narratives' and 'narratology' for, lastly, generating the working assumptions and hypotheses the rest of this study will rest upon.

3.1 Ontological In-/Security and Societal Security

In one of the above newspaper clippings that opened this section, president Erdoğan identified both 'the state' and 'the nation' as the attacked (see Hürriyet Daily News 2016q). Similarly, by-then deputy-Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmuş saw the 'terror' Turkey was facing *not* only resembled by militants but by 'something undefined' that threatened Turkey's existence (see Hürriyet Daily News 2016s). In this section, I argue that Ontological In-/Security Theory provide the correct lens into Turkey's framing of this issue, in general, and president Erdoğan's, in particular.

Ontological In-/Security Theory argues that an entity's actions follow its need of a *continuous* 'sense of self-identity' (Sigmund Freudian *Seinsgewissheit*), e.g. in moments of uncertainty and existential threat and/or with regards to the entity's relationships to other entities. It argues that 'subjects' do not only care about physical and material security needs ('security as survival') but also the insurance of a consistent and ongoing (Rumelili 2015b, 61) *or* a reflexive sense of self-identity ('security as being'). Thereby, a 'subject' can be a state, a nation, a society, a group , an individual, or alike actor (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2016, 3). This contains the premise that all those subjects demonstrate human needs and thereby acquire the qualities of social *agents* (Steele 2005, 526), which questions traditionalist

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[8] What the Turkish state, if at all, refers to as 'Kurdish issue', foreign powers call 'Kurdish Question' while pro-separatist Kurds refer to it as 'Kurdish Movement'.

premises in IR that argue that states do not have 'selves' that 'identify' with or 'care' about issues, events, or 'Others'.

In addition to a, rather typical for humanities, diversion along lines of "referent objects (individual, society, group, state), different political outcomes (cooperation, conflict, violence; stability or change) and different methods (quantitative, qualitative, discursive)" (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2016, 3), the Ontological In-/Security literature diverges regarding the question of whether self-identity needs trump (Mitzen 2006, 350) *or* supplement (Browning and Joenniemi 2016, 5; McSweeney 1999) physical and material security needs. Bahar Rumelili (2015b, 60) clarified that "the pursuit of physical security entails both the naming and identification of threats, and the development of measures to defend the Self against those threats." Thereby, the 'threat' that arouses *fear* may take the form of an event, a relationship, a development or 'Others' and may also be desecuritized if the 'self' adapts its identity reflexively or *anxiety* is aroused (Browning and Joenniemi 2016; Rumelili 2015b).

Most importantly, instead of tracing, for example, like the popular concept of 'securitization' the Copenhagen School (Waever and Buzan 1993) *how something becomes a security threat*, Ontological In-/Security Studies has its focal point on *how the threat recipient reacts*. According to Jennifer Mitzen (2006, 341), for instance, the pursuit of Ontological Security reputedly "leads actors to *routinize* relationships with significant others'" (ibid., 59; my italics); per Brent Steele (2005, 526) they "choose 'courses of action comfortable with their sense of identity'." Most often, Ontological In-/Security Theory tries to analyze which particular 'needs' drive states' in-/action and links physical security needs to the human needs for 'stability' and 'recognition' (Rumelili 2015b; Mitzen 2006), as well as their positively and negatively affiliated counterparts like honor (Lebow 2006; Steele 2005; Steele 2008), shame (Zarakol 2010; Subotić and Zarakol 2013), stigma (Zarakol 2014; Adler-Nissen 2014), and alike.

3.2 Ontological In-/Security and Turkey's 'Kurdish Issue'

Rumelili (2015a) used Ontological In-/Security Theory to demonstrate how *anxiety* perpetuated throughout the resolution process in an asymmetric state-PKK relationship, whilst Çelik (2015) argued that *fear* caused the failure of the Kurdish Opening. Kardaş and

Balci (2016) contest that an inter-societal security trilemma persists between islamists, nationalist Kurds, and the ruling AKP which lead to a failure of addressing the Kurdish Question by the state. Furthermore, they explained that a national trauma referred to by the literature as 'the Sèvres syndrome' "often leads to misperceiving Kurdish demands for cultural rights as 'threat to the existence of the Turkish state" (ibid., 162). Bilgin and Ince (2015) further explain that Ontological Insecurity already prevails since the Early Republican Period (1923-1945) when the first citizenship regime was adopted. I will dwell on these further in section 4.

Regarding the post-July 2015 events, Maurizio Geri (2016) analyzed that the AKP implemented a strategy of securitization between the termination of the ceasefire with the PKK in July 2015 and early 2016, due to a historically grounded low level of Ontological Security by the Turkish state, and a *fear* of power loss by and threat to the agenda of the ruling AKP elite posed by the electoral successes of the HDP. Similarly, Karabekir Akkoyunlu and Kerem Öktem (2016, 505; emphasis added) emanate from a "confluence of already existing 'ontological insecurities' […] subnational 'tribalisms' […] and recently emerging systemic crises at both the domestic and regional level" that the ruling AKP to some extent instrumentalizes this atmosphere for the purpose of power maintenance and regime change towards the implementation of a presidential system. Or, to be more precise, they argue that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan "has been both a major contributor and a victim of the existential insecurities that have precipitated Turkey's exit from democracy" (ibid., 520). Arguably, Erdoğan *produced* an 'existential threat narrative' because of "exponentially rising stakes of [his pursuit of constructing 'New Turkey'], the hostilities, resentments and rights violations it has generated […] as the AKP is no longer in a position to engage in electoral competition on fair terms and accept sharing or relinquishing power in the case of defeat" (ibid.).

Moreover, Akkoyunlu and Öktem (2016, 519) outline that 'media pundits' like the pro-governmental *Yeni Şafak* newspaper embellish a questionable *narrative* the governments opted for and frame the challenging political developments and security issues as follow:

> It portrays Erdoğan as the true embodiment of democracy and the nation's will, from which those designated by the government as terrorist, traitor or 'anti-national' (*gayrı-milli*) are excluded. Simultaneously, it justifies the abuse or suspension of democratic procedures and rule of law on the

basis of emergency laws, whether in forced seizures of private property, shutting down opposition media and arresting critical journalists, granting legal immunity to security forces participating in counter-terrorism operations or repeating unfavourable election results.

This seems particularly interesting, as Aydınlı (2011, 220) already described that during the European accession negotiations the Kurdish Question got securitized. It "serves as a constant provocation to Turkish suspicions that Europe seeks a divided Turkey" and that "as long as the armed units of the PKK are used or perceived as bargaining/blackmailing elements, Turkey will feel forced to conduct operations – even cross-border ones – to eliminate these units" (ibid., 221). Furthermore, Lohmus (2016) used a combined approach of qualitative interviews with HDP and AKP politicians for investigating 'the Kurdish Factor' in Turkey's 2015-2016 foreign policy and found that "claims of national unity of the country were not as frequent during the de-securitization period [of the Kurdish peace process] in 2013, [and that] this changed officially […] in July 2015" when the conflict resumed. Thus, narrative analysis occurs to be a fruitful ground for data collection (cf. Roe 1989, 251).

Against these backdrops, I align myself with the existent scholarship and argue hereafter that Turkish counterterrorism happened under the conditions of Ontological Insecurity. Furthermore, it seems fruitful to investigate to what extent Akkoyunlu and Öktem's (2016, 519) argument concerning *Yeni Şafak* as a 'distributor of questionable narratives by the president' prevails for other Turkish media outlets (see 3.7 and 4).

3.3 Narratives in Ontological In-/Security Studies

'Narratives' are both a form of discourse in human communication and a research methodology. Qualitative researchers have employed the term in a variety of meanings. For Somers and Gibson (1994, 59), "the chief characteristic of a 'narrative' is that it renders understanding only by connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices." According to Patterson and Monroe's (1998, 316) psychological account, a classical 'narrative' differs from other modes of discourse and experience organization in several important ways: (a) its assumption of agency and

purposeful action towards goals; and (b) its provision of cognitive maps of the speaker by how s/he makes sense of a specific context or commonplace, organizes experiences, their relation to others.

Most importantly for the uncertain case of Turkey, Emery M. Roe (1989, 251) suggested as a lesson from her investigation into Medfly controversy 1980-1982 in California that narrative analysis of politicians might be the only means to grasp issues, when official information of their politics are lacking. Narratives (c) do not only provide data for analysis concerning verbal responses but also extra-linguistic aspects, e.g. spaces and silences; and eventually (d) how the speaker ascribes meaning to events, himself and actors (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 320; Monroe 2002, 400). As 'narratives' are thus normative and "profoundly influenced by what is possible and what is valued within our culture" (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 320; cf.. Feldman et al. 2004; Feldman 2013), their analysis (narratology) becomes an interpretation of an actor's conception of meaning.

In Ontological Security Studies literature, narratives are either stories, tales and mythologies states tell about themselves, to themselves and others and assist in constructing, re-constructing and de-constructing the sense of 'self' and 'identity'. [9] Simultaneously, they move the central referent object from the 'self with needs' to particular "identity claims attached to or articulated" by the narrative (Browning and Joenniemi 2016, 21). In the following, I argue that this diversity of approaches is actually problematic and that a return to the 'inventors' of the concept, Anthony Giddens and Ronald D. Laing, is needed.

For Anthony Giddens (1991, 54), Ontological Security is an ability, or rather "the capacity to keep *a particular narrative* going" even in "an external environment full of changes" (ibid., 53). Giddens (1991, 53) original notion saw the "*self* as reflexively understood by an individual in terms of his or her own *biography*" and identity "continuity as reflexively understood by the agent." He argues that individuals develop this capacity in childhood, based on trustful relations. Those relations constitute "a protective cocoon

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[9] This is also the definition of 'narratives' this study adopts, as a distinct notion from Felix Berenskoetter's (2014) understanding of 'biographical narratives' (see p.13-14).

which 'filters out', in the practical conduct of day-to-day life, many of the dangers which in principle threaten the *integrity* of the self" (ibid. 54; my italics). Therefore, Ontological Security is closely tied to "practical consciousness – or in phenomenological terms, to the 'bracketing's' presumed by the 'natural attitude' in everyday life" (ibid., 36).

What is neglected in current IR approaches to Ontological In-/Security Theory is that Giddens derived much of his concepts from psychologist Ronald D. Laing's *oeuvre* (e.g. Laing 1960; 1967). Psychiatrist Laing (1960) noticed that his psychopathic patience lack 'a proper grounding of the self in the world', "lack a consistent feeling of *biographical continuity* [… due to] discontinuity in temporal experience" (ibid., 107), and referred to this observation as Ontological *In*security. He explained that an ontologically insecure person cannot take his identity and that of others for granted and constantly looks for ways to avoid losing their self in an 'inner deadness', i.e. ways to recreate security *about* oneself rather than for oneself. Following from this, Giddens (1991, 63) saw Ontological Security as a prerequisite for agency (in high modernity) and described that "competent agents routinely '*keep in touch' with* the grounds [core identity] of their behavior." Thus, narratives must be considered as dynamic.

Similarly, Brent Steele and Will Delehanty (2009, 523), for example, emphasize that states desire to live up to their self-proclamations; they are "internally through the development of autobiographical narratives [… constructed and] draw upon national histories and experience to provide continuity and 'substance' to a state's conception of its Self-identity". Catarina Kinnvall (2004a, 755) shares the emphasis on the importance of history, yet, in more historical experiences of the self *for the provision of* "comforting stories [about the Self] in times of increased ontological insecurity and existential anxiety". Herzog (2014, 3) argues that narratives have an "ageless nature with which national identities are portrayed [but] they actually evolve continuously by adapting themselves to the tastes and trends of the contemporary age". Further, attempting to bridge Ontological Security and Realism, Mitzen (Mitzen 2006) describes the routinization of interactions over time as *the internalization of a story* which "transforms state identity and generates attachment" to an Other. Similarly, yet distinct from Ontological Security, constructivists confirm that states over the course of time develop 'national security cultures' which are in part constituted by

national mythologies of important events and friendly and hostile relationships with others.[10]

At its strongest, and this is also the understanding this study confirms, Felix Berenskoetter (2014, 282) promoted a phenomenological approach inspired by Heidegger and contends that *biographical* narratives are a "constitutive force providing a community with a collective identity from the 'inside'" and thereby form the nation to a state. Thereby, Berenskoetter (ibid., 264) argues that a nation's/state's room for and meanings attached to past/future experiences form the basis for their respective ontology of being-in-the-world and, thus, their narratives. Instead of examining how a collective identity is constituted through social differentiation, i.e. the relation to external Others, his narratology through 'biography' explores how identity is subjective, or Self-organized, and formed in time and space through 'private knowledge'(ibid.). Spatially, the biography of a community is not bound to physical boundaries (e.g. borders) but limited by the 'boundaries of its collective consciousness' (ibid. 268). On a societal level, a 'biographical narrative' embeds individuals in 'national consciousness' by providing a 'basic discourse' of a hegemonic 'master narrative' and 'political potency' (ibid., 270, 279).

3.4 Contestation and Modification of Hegemonic Narratives

The construction of a 'biographical narrative' is an interpretive act and open to contestation by 'alternative narratives' (ibid., 279). Thus, multiple autobiographical narratives, i.e. a dominant narrative and one or more counter-narratives may be present at the same time (Hopf 2002; Delehanty and Steele 2009). Those alternative narratives might be "related to the dominant narrative that [co-]constitutes a state's sense of Self; but that can also […] potentially challenge, subvert and transform" it (Delehanty and Steele 2009, 531). Regarding the case of Turkey, Herzog (2014, 2) viewed as "super-containers, which can create a sense

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[10] See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, "The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Thomas Berger, "Cultures of antimilitarism: national security in Germany and Japan).
Patrick Geary, „The myth of nations: the medieval origins of Europe" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), or Duncan Bell (Ed.), "Memory, Trauma and World Politics" (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

of collective belonging akin to a 'community of cultural sameness'." Hakan Ovunc Ongur (2016) argued that its counter-narratives would be a continuance of the authoritarian tradition and sociopolitical discourses of the Republic's 1930s CHP – which sections five to seven within this paper will confirm. Moreover, Derya Erdem (2014) found that the mass media delegitimized political factions of the Kurdish minority (like the HDP) as groups supporting the PKK solely wanting separatism. This contributes to a disruptive narrative that consists of an 'us' that is separate from 'them'.

Let me return to Berenskoetter (2014). In Heidegger's phenomenological fashion, 'being-in-the-world' lends significance to a co-constitution of knowledge accumulated through experience (*Erlebnis*) in the world and the Self (Heidegger 2001/1953 (1927), 54, 110, 133 – cited in Berenskoetter 2014, 268). Meaning, the surrounding space (*Umraum*) and the environment (*Umfeld/Umwelt*) are close to Self not in terms of physical proximity but knowledge and evaluation (ibid., 275). For Berenskoetter (2014, 15), biographical narratives look both backward on memories and forward on visions "and, thus, seek to locate the Self in the past and the future, thereby lending the historical/future Self ontological[ly certain] status." Significant experiences, how they are remembered and "what meaning is extracted from the past emerges only in the process of sorting future possibilities of being, in formulating visions of what being-in-the-world could look like" (ibid., 273).

Those significant experiences do not necessarily rupture the narrative "if the storyteller is able to make good sense of them and adjust the story accordingly" (ibid., 279). Drawing on Giddens (cf. 1991, 54, 76), Berenskoetter (2014, 279) conceptualizes the 'biography' as "something that has to be worked at, and calls for creative input", e.g. by continuous integration of events into the ongoing story narrative.

Drawing on Ontological In-/Security Theory, biographical narratives, and Serbia's Kosovo narrative in the early millennials, Jelena Subotić (2016, 623) found that "Serbian political and social actors strategically activated some elements of the Serbian master narrative ([for Serbia,] 'sacrifice' and 'great power injustice') and deactivated other ([for Serbia,] 'inevitable return' [of Kosovo])". She argues that at times of threats to physical, social, and ontological state securities, i.e. times of great crises like the situation 2015-16 Turkey was in, "narratives are selectively activated to provide a cognitive bridge between

policy change that resolves the physical security challenge, while also preserving state ontological security through offering autobiographical continuity, a sense of routine, familiarity, and calm" (ibid, 610). Similarly, regarding the case of China, William Callahan (2004) highlighted that, amongst others, a 'narrative of national salvation' depending on 'national humiliation' and one 'narrative of national security' depending on 'national insecurity' are prevalent. Further, Callahan (2004) found that in moments of crisis, ranging from geopolitics to economy and identity, a narrative known as 'Great China' is deployed. It remains, thus, to be examined whether President Erdogan is employing similar strategies.

3.5 Generated Hypotheses

This section took stock on current approaches to Turkey's counterterrorism since the recent resurgence of violence with the PKK in July 2015, Ontological In-/Security Theory, and narratives. Thereby, fundamental conceptual debates and working assumptions (hypotheses) from similar cases that other scholars investigated came to the fore:

1. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan adopts a societally divisive narrative that is distributed by media outlets (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016).

2. This devise narrative contests features of the Turkish 'master narrative' (Berenskoetter 2014).

3. Features of the 'master narrative' are de-/activated for justifying unpopular policy choices in phases of Ontological Insecurity (Subotić 2016).

4. Methodology

A scholarly work on a recent event or range of recent events of political importance must navigate its way around an obstacle course. It must make a case of: (1) the difficulty of being 'too early' for completely accurate facts and being 'too late' for still catching interest (Thomas 2016). For testing if/how President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan uses (biographical) narratives to justify Turkey's counterterrorism approaches towards the PKK, the following section will first develop a master template of the hegemonic state narrative of Turkey (or in Berenskoetter's language, a 'master narrative'), before section 5 will test if and how the key features of the 'master narrative' are distributed in the Turkish online medium *Hürriyet Daily News* and evaluate the findings. Section 6 will then discuss their implications for the hypotheses generated in passage 2.6 and current debates in OSS.

4.1 Data Collection

The speeches analyzed were gathered and clipped from newspaper articles from *Hürriyet Daily News*'s database containing the combined keywords 'terror' *and* 'Erdoğan' between 26 November 2015 and 22 May 2016 (276 hits). It was refrained from using 'PKK' instead of 'terror', as the entity is sometimes referred to as 'the separatist terror organization', 'the terror organization' only, or, as shown in the introduction to this dissertation, subsumed into a general 'terror cocktail' with the possibility of not all its ingredients named. *Hürriyet Daily News* as the English counterpart of *Hürriyet*, belonging to the governmental-friendly *Doğan Media Group*, was chosen for two reasons. First, it is the most distributed Turkish online newspaper available in English, and its Turkish counterpart one of the biggest Turkish daily newspapers. Kaya and Çakmur (2010, 531) even see Hürriyet as the "flag-ship of Turkish media". Thus, one may assume a great scope of the articles beyond Turkey's borders and that they contain a representative state narrative with self-censorship (Sezgin and Wall 2005). In its online articles, *Hürriyet Daily News* quotes President Erdoğan's speeches from the official state news agency *Anadolu Ajensi* or statements from his presidential website yet may crop and publish only the most significant parts of the

speeches/statements. However, second, unlike the official state media agency *Anadolu Ajensi,* it possesses a database that allows to search for time frames and keywords.

4.2 Data Analysis

In a first step, the 276 articles were preliminary analyzed regarding their content, namely whether Erdoğan gave a speech or statement or if the article just conveyed descriptive information. If an article contained a speech, it was interpreted whether this speech explains or justifies Turkey's counterterrorism towards the PKK (16 hits). The identified articles were analyzed along a most similar approach with regards to the frequency, intensity, and content. Divided into four phases with appeals and features of related to the developed master narrative from section five highlighted, the 16 speech excerpts contain four 'biographical narrative speech excerpts' (Biographical narrative speeches) and are presented in section six. Subsequently, section seven analyses them semiotically *(Feldman et al.* 2004), and discusses their implications for the hypotheses generated in section 3.6.

4.3 Limitations

Narrative analysis is distinct from the popular 'case narrative approach' in IR for which the "coherence and 'followability'" (Kratochwil 2006, 22, cited in Steele 2008, 8) would be paramount. Instead of deconstructing the state's action at a given plot, narratology deconstructs the explanation or justifications of it (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 329). Its insufficiency is a cognitive one: Even if we set decision makers synonym with the state action they take the responsibility for, we cannot look inside their stream of thought when we analyze the words which left their mouth (Stein 2002, 109–11). In its essence, 'narrative analysis' remains a subjective approach, highly dependent on the paradigm, rigorousness, carefulness, and creativity of the scholar. For a young researcher, the 'biographical narrative' approach is particularly limited to the pragmatics of the scholarly work and historiography already done regarding the country and/or case (here: Turkey). Critics may even scold these sections as 'conceptual' instead of national narratives (Helo 2016, 3; Somers and Gibson 1994, 59). Further, Geller and Singer (1998, 5) remind every empirical social sciences researcher of the germane distinction between the two major types of errors in empirical investigations:

in the Type II error, we overestimate the evidence that leads us to see a pattern when it may not exist in empirical reality, while the Type I tendency is more likely to infer randomness and to thus overlook a strong but nonobvious configuration Both are, in principle, to be avoided, but those of us who assume that social phenomena are inherently systematic, patterned, and law-like – and who are therefore more positive about scientific method – normally will err in the Type II direction. (…) On the other hand, those who are excessively critical, or take a dim view of the social science enterprise, or see international history as little more than one unique event after another will tend to miss a potentially significant but less visible set of regularities.

In addition, this study may face language and hermeneutical limitations. As the author does not know Turkish on a fluent enough level for confirming the relevant narrative semantics in the period available for this study, she had to limit her data to English material only. Although the leading Turkish newspaper circulating in English *Hürriyet Daily News* translated the data, the meaning to the original Turkish speeches might differ. For illustration, it is known that during the original Turkish speeches, the PKK is mostly referred to as 'separatist terrorist group', whilst in the English translations its abbreviation is most of the time provided (Hürriyet Daily News 2016e).

5.   Turkey's (Master) National Narrative Template

[c]   *We saw the fire and betrayal.*
                                    And in the market of the bloody bankers
                                    Those who sold the country to the Germans
                        and rested on the bodies of those who had died [in war]
                                                now worried about their own lives.
                                    And to save their heads from the people's wrath
                                                            they fled in the dark.
[b]   *Wounded, tired, and poor was the nation, but*
                                    it was [still] fighting the most ferocious countries.
[a]   *It was fighting still so that it was not enslaved twice,*
                                                so that it was not robbed twice.

(Nazim Hikmet, "Liberation War Epos", *Kurtuluş Savaşı Destanı,*
cited in Yanikdag 2015, 102; my italics)

This section argues that a dominant Turkish biographical narrative as a self-identity of the state exists which is built on the *memory* of the Turkish people, engaged in a hazardous struggle for the recognition of their nation (*vision*), and thereby disgraced by disloyalty of domestic people and a conspiracy of foreign powers against it (Jung 2003; Zarakol 2011). Before I explain the relevant developments connected to it, I wish to illustrate the deep anchoring of two tragic events for the Turkish nation on the example of the above excerpt of a poem by the Turkish poet and writer Nâzim Hikmet (1902-1963) called 'Liberation War Epos' (*Kurtuluş Savaşı Destanı*). First, one must relativize, as Hikmet is charecterized as a (romantic) socialist, he is critical towards bankers and the burgeosie from the second to the seventh line. Second, one must emphasize the important aspects of the Turkish narrative he describes in just four lines: [a] the conditions of the First World War (1914-1919) and the War of Liberation (*Kurtuluş Savaşı;* 1919-1923), [b] the hazardous struggle of honorable Turkish people for their nation in relation to *and* against foreign powers, and [c] the nation thereby still suffering from 'fire and betrayal'. Hereinafter, I explain the relevant features of what I call 'The Unity by Integrity Theme' and 'The International Others Theme'. In rationalist language, 'loyalty and integrity of internal people' and 'an honorable relation to foreign powers' as the x-conditions to the success of the struggle for progress of the Turkish nation as the y-condition. Both themes are consisting of two features each: [1] The Internal Unity By Integrity Theme comprises [1a] Separatist People Feature, [1b]

Separatist Territory Feature, [1c] National Unity Feature; whilst [2] The International Others Theme encompasses questions of a [2a] Foreign Conspiracy Feature, an [2b] International Recognition Feature, and a [2c] Bloc Membership Feature.

5.1 The Internal Unity by Integrity Theme

It is undisputed among scholarship that much of this narrative was born during the period of the late Ottoman Empire (1789-1923), as the predecessor state, and the Single Party Period of the Republic of Turkey (1923-1945), as the nation-building time of the successor state. When forming the nation, the first president and so-called 'father' of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk adopted a diverse set of reforms which mostly provided distinction but also continuity regarding the legacy of the dismissed Ottoman Empire. To be more precise: The facts that the Ottoman Empire (a) lost the first World War as part of the Central Powers, (b) in addition to its successive loss of territory since the late 18th century,[11] ceded its non-Turkish territories (*vilayets*) to Allied administration, and had its Anatolian mainland partitioned by the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) were condemned as shameful (Zarakol 2010). Furthermore, (c) seeing its Arab *vilayets* becoming second class colonies by *League of Nations* mandates largely inspired by the infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement raised anxiety (Bilgin and Ince 2015).

By letting his representatives sign the treaty, the last Ottoman sultan, Mehmed VI, accepted the partition of the Empire's territory. This lead to an Armenian state in the northeast and east of the Anatolian mainland, some Western parts of the Ottoman Empire being adjudged to Greece (Thrace, several Aegean islands, and the land region around the Izmir province), the creation of a Kurdish autonomous region in the southeast of Anatolia, the Straits and the Marmara region being demilitarized and under international control, and tremendous zones of influence by the French, Italian and British spanning more than half of the territory of today's Turkey (Montgomery 1972). Arguably, Mehmed VI could be one

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[11] For an excellent overview on the contexts of the territorial losses of the Ottoman's in Northern Africa, the Balkans and Greece, see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, "A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire," (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

of those described in Nazim Hikmet's abovementioned poem who fled in the dark for saving their heads from people's wrath.

As reasons of loss of the First World War, ethnicities which rebelled against the Ottoman Sultan and weakened the Empire from the inside were identified and condemned as betrayers or traitors. For illustration, Arab subjects rioted against the Ottoman administration from June 1916 to October 1918 on the Arabic Peninsula and in the Levantine region with the support of the British T.E. Lawrence ('from Arabia') and Mark Sykes, believing in the British High Commissioner of Egypt's pledge to the Sharif of Mecca to grant the Arabs their independent land (known as *Hussein-McMahon Correspondence*).[12] In addition, between 1915 and 1918, the Armenian subjects living in the northeast and eastern provinces of Anatolia were believed to represent an illoyal people too close to the border with and front against the Soviets, and were therefore 'relocated' further away to the Syrian deserts (Akçam 2004).[13]

In the dominant Turkish narrative, it was due to brevity and glory of the national liberation movement lead by Mustafa Kemal *Paşa* that the Anatolian soil could be liberated from the occupying powers in 1923. Noteworthy enough, the Turkish *Kurtuluş Savaşı* literally means Liberation War, yet is mostly translated as 'War of Independence' or as 'National Struggle' in English literature. The major battles and benchmark dates of the Liberation War are celebrated as national holidays until today (Yanikdag 2015, 102). Even the 1982 constitution emphasizes the "Turkish state, with its territory and nation, [to be] an indivisible entity" (Article 3) but is insufficiently analyzed to what extent it is grounded in both the experience of lost wars against European powers in Northern Africa, as well as the partition and foreign occupation (Aydınlı 2004).

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[12] For a comprehensive introduction on these issues, see Karen Culcasi, "Disordered Ordering: Mapping the Divisions of the Ottoman Empire," *The International Journal for Geographic Information and Geovisualization* 49(1): 2-17.

[13] Whilst many Western countries refer to those 'relocations' as 'deportations' and 'genocide' on the Armenian people, the Turkish state deems them as 'necessary' and 'mass killings' against the evils of war in line with the by-then *ius in bello* (Suny and Göcek 2011, 10; Zarakol 2010; Gürpınar 2016).

5.1.1 Early Republican Identity Politics

Furthermore, it is uncontested that the Republic of Turkey derived its 'minority' concept from the *millet* system of its Ottoman past (Barkey and Gavrilis 2016; Oran 2007).[14] The foundational Treaty of Lausanne and the constitution of modern Turkey adopted minority rights, e.g. concerning language and education, for non-Muslim citizens on Turkey's soil, namely Christians and Jews. Because the Kurdish population is predominantly constisting of Muslims, they are thus not regarded as a minority, even though the Kurds are ethnically or linguistically distinct from the Turkish population (Oran 2007). Simultaneously, a Sunni Hanafi yet virtuous secular Turkish nationalism (*milliyetçilik)* was proclaimed for forming the citizens of the newly founded state (Herzog 2014, 6) and 'Turkishness' set as a requirement for being considered a citizen (Gambetti and Jongerden 2015, 4).[15] "The assimilation of ethnic and cultural difference into a ubiquitous Turkish identity was the main objective of the state" (Gambetti and Jongerden 2015, 3).

On the other side, Bilgin and Ince (2015, 506) point out that it is contested, however, to what extent this citizenship regime arose anxiety and ontological insecurity. Arguably, the Turkish *Leitkultur* and Kemalist Republican paradigms dominated and repressed ethnic identities, like Kurds, Laz, Zaza, Alevi (Yanmis 2016, 3; Kardaş and Balci 2016, 162).[16] Others claim that only the ever since prevailing struggles of Turks vs. Kurds, but also Sunni vs. Alevi and particularly Secularists vs. Islamists are grounded in this early

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[14] The *millet* system grouped the subjects of the Empire in terms of their religion to collective juridical communities and regulated their rights and duties in the Ottoman Empire since 1454 (Oran 2007, 37), i.e. Armenian (*millet-i sadıka*), Greek Orthodox millet, Jewish millet and, arguably, the ruling Muslim community (*millet-i hakimiye; Ümmet*). Depending on their relation towards the Sultan, the *millets* were granted social and economic rights of different scope, and had disparate militaristic and taxation duties to fulfill. In return, non-Muslim *millets* were guaranteed religious freedom in terms of tolerance and permission for their practices. Due to the predominantly, although not completely, Sunni Muslim constitution of Kurds, they were members of the *Ümmet* and were allowed varied professions (Aydınlı 2004; Klein 2011).

[15] Article No. 88 of the 1924 Constitution states: "The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish in terms of citizenship."

[16] For a good discussion on alternative interpretation of the Single Party Period's identity politics, see for example Akile Zorlu-Durukan, "Ismayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu and Alternative Interpretations of the Early Republican Modernization Project," *Int. Journal of Turkish Studies* 18(1/2) (2012): 39-62. For a dialectical analysis of Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, see Serhun Ali, "Elite Discourses, Nationalism and Moderation: A Dialectical Analysis of Turkish and Kurdish Nationalisms", *Ethnopolitics* 14(1) (2014): 94-11. For a good discussion on different nationalist discourses in Turkey, see Tanıl Bora, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102(2/3) (2003): 433-451.

Republican period (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016, 509; Bilgin 2008). According to Kardaş and Balcı (2016, 161-163), this lead to an overall ethnical security dilemma in Turkish society and, arguably, may account to what Delehanty and Steele (2009) outlined as alternative autobiographical narratives contesting a hegemonic national narrative. Thus, one may argue that the Liberation War was fought in two ways, namely against imperialist, capitalist, colonialist and opportunist external forces *and* against conservative, reactionary and traditionalist internal opposition forces (Kaymaz 1976, 616, cited in Yanikdag 2015, 102).

5.1.2 The Kurdish Movement and the PKK

 "In the late Ottoman Empire, a debate raged between proponents of a centralist state under Turkish domination and defenders of a decentralized and more pluralist polity. In its successor state, the Republic of Turkey, the balance has tilted solidly in favor of centralist and Turkish nationalist views" (Leezenberg 2016, 672). Zeynep Gambetti and Joost Jongerden (2015, 3) describe from the Kurdish perspective that "during the 1920s and 1930s, the newly established state of Turkey practiced a *de facto* politics of colonization vis-à-vis the territory that had become 'the southeast' on its map [, …] imposed its authority over the peoples living there (Kurds, Arabs, Armenians and Syrians, along with Turks and others) and proceeded to keep the region under firm [centralized] control thereafter." In return, Kurds rebelled 18 times against the state in Koçgiri (1921), Seyh Said (1925), Ağrı (1926-1930; with the declaration of the 'Kurdish Republic of Ararat' in 1927/8), Oramar (1930) and Dersim (1937). The government referred to these rebels as 'secessionists', declared states of emergencies for confining them spatially (Aydınlı 2004, 119; Gambetti and Jongerden 2015, 4; Yanmis 2016, 3) and killed dozens of thousands among the Kurdish population (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016, 509; Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, 34). In the aftermath of the rebellions, the central government at times imposed right restrictions, e.g. a ban on the exercise of the Kurdish language in 1925 (Kolçak 2016, 29). In addition,

Turkification and assimilation policies were introduced, spanning from the promotion of the language, over education, to the field of media politics.[17]

Such policies were intensified during the Multiparty Period (post-1945), when governments which diverged from the hegemonic Kemalist state narrative in terms of Islamist proximity and/or authoritarian tendencies, were repeatedly overthrown by military coups (Gieler 2013, 38).[18] In 1960, names of Kurdish towns got a Turkish name; in 1971, giving newborns non-Turkish names was banned (ibid., 31). In 1978, the PKK was founded on Marxist Leninist principles as a Kurdish political group; in 1980, the "explanation, publication and broadcasting of ideas and opinions in any language other than Turkish" was banned (Kolçak 2016, 31). In 1984, the PKK conducted its first violent attacks.[19] In the 1980s and 1990s, its camps spanned to Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian territories (Gambetti and Jongerden 2015, 4; Leezenberg 2016, 673). When the PKK declared its 'liberation struggle' in the 1980s, it systematically used "revolutionary violence as a means of provoking increased state repression and thus raising, or creating, national and revolutionary consciousness among the Kurdish masses" (ibid.). In the 1990s, the insurgency (*Serhildan*) "showed signs of turning into a genuine popular revolt [… but when the leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1998] it had become clear that the popular uprising in Turkey had failed" (ibid.). TSK and special units took a full-fledged war in Southeast and East Anatolia, with the affected portions of declared as part of an Emergency region (*Olağanüstü Hâl Bölge Valiliği,* OHAL).

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[17] To name but a few, during the 1930s, "textbooks described Turkish as the most beautiful, easiest and richest language on the globe, […] mentioning nothing about the other Anatolian languages and dialects [… and] emphasized the importance of 'being a Turk, living as a Turk and dying as a Turk' by saying 'how happy is the one who *says* I am a Turk'" (*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*; Kolçak 2016, 30; emphasis added).

[18] By constitution, Turkish governments are demanded to maintain secularism and to ban the influence of religion on politics. When governments of the multi-party period (1945-present) were deemed to be too religiously influenced or too authoritarian, the military overthrew them (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, 37–47). For a concise discussion of Turkish identity politics towards the Kurdish issue since the 1982 constitution, see William Hale, "Developing the Democratic Identity: Search For a New Constitution," in *Turkey and the politics of national identity: social, economic and cultural transformation*, ed. Shane Brennan and Marc Herzog (London: Tauris, 2014), 47-50.

[19] For a good discussion on the role of the human rights discourse for the Kurdish Question, see Fatih Balci, "Politicization of Kurdish Question Through Human Rights Discourse in Turkey", (Utah: University of Utah, 2008).

5.2 The International Others Theme

Turkey's narrative is further shaped by its changing relationship to external others in terms of space, geopolitics, and Bloc Membership and the persistence of the 'Sèvres syndrome' as an "anachronistic worldview" (Jung 2003) of being "encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state" as in the 1920s and equating external with internal/integrity threats (ibid.). Or, in Kardaş and Balci's words (2016, 162), the 'Sèvres syndrome' is "a conviction that there is an international conspiracy to weaken and divide Turkey". As the Sèvres syndrome originates in the developments of the 1920s, Dietrich Jung (2003) investigated that it represents a durable 'social habitus' of Kemalist elite but he does not make any observations regarding non-Kemalist societal streams in Turkey, such as the AKP and its electorate. Surveying contemporary Turkey, Fatma Müge Göçek (2011) sees social tensions prevailing in the country rooted in the experience of the divisive experience of the Treaty of Sèvres prevailing in Turkey's foreign policy, due to an uneasy relationship with 'the West'.

When Turkey considered spatial arguments like its geopolitical / transit location and developments in its adjacent areas for the development of its foreign policy in the late 1990s and early millennials, IR scholarship either confirmed or merged the 'Sèvres syndrome' to a 'fear of being divided' or 'sensitivity for national unity'(Aydınlı 2002; Aydınlı 2004; Bilgin 2005; Bilgin 2006; Cizre 2003). According to the former academician Ahmet Davutoğlu (2013), this rupture is tied to the necessity of a paradigm change for the post-Cold War era and Turkey's adherent vision positioning as a proactive and rising power. Interestingly enough, Itir Toksöz (2009, 82) states that civilian and military spheres "frequently emphasized regional instabilities as part of the news security problems of Turkey", because it provides a ground for other external threats, particularly 'terrorism', to emerge.

Since the 1990s, waves of writing were analyzing the Republic of Turkey as a long-time book case example of how 'modernization' and 'democratization' could work in a pre-dominantly Muslim country (Göksel 2016) and tried to to read the country's identity struggle in terms of its regime's as well as political, economic, and social membership to Europe and/or the Middle East (Cizre 2016; Hale 2010; Leiße 2013; Rabasa and Larrabee 2008; Jung 2001). Interestingly enough, much of those debates on Turkey's position and

role in the international system were mostly conducted by non-Turkish scholars, and arguably reflected the country internal sociopolitical contestation of its self-image (Herzog 2014, 7; Seufert 2012). In this discourse, two of the most fruitful contributions were made by Ayşe Zarakol (2011; 2010) as well as Pinar Bilgin and Başak Ince (2015) who draw on the interwar period in Turkey and outline that 'the West' became an ideal type for modernization *mimicry* due to factors like 'stigmatization', 'strive for recognition', and 'shame' – which emphasizes the long-lasting ambivalent relationship of Turkey with 'the West'.

From 1823 to 1876, the Sultans adopted rigorous reformation packages in the framework of the *Tanzimât* period (literally translating to 'reorganization period') concerning their military, their economic and taxation systems, and the rights for their citizens. The subjects of the dominant *millet-i hakimiye,* however, saw the *Tanzimât* means of submission to the West, as Western traders were allowed so-called 'capitulations', as special trade rights (Aydınlı 2004). Between 1924-38, Atatürk designed the attainment of the level of contemporary, i.e. Western, civilizations as the primary Turkish goal (*muasir medeniyet seviyesine ulaşmak*; Hanioglu 2011; Herzog 2014, 4) and adopted further sets of reforms regarding culture, education, and finances for enhancing the prosperity and recognition of the nation (Heper 1993, 9; Hanioglu 2011): For example, the alphabet was switched from Arabic to Latin (1929) and clothes were westernized (1923, 1924, 1934). Further drawing from Emile Durkheim, 'religion' was identified as countering the 'progress' of the nation. After the abolishment of the Caliphate, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) was established in 1924 not to separate religion from politics but to control religion by politics (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008, 33).

During the Second World War, Turkey chose to not select any side, stayed neutral until 1945, and became a founding member of the United Nations. During the post-World War II phase, she participates in the Council of Europe (since 1949), joines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (in 1952), becomes an associate of the European Community in 1963, and turns into a strategic partner of the United States in the Middle East (Eylem and Bilgin 2006, 40; Bilgin and Ince 2015, 502). In 1995, Turkey applied for membership to the European Union and, thus, continued its policy focus on affiliation to

the Western sphere (Eylem and Bilgin 2006, 57; Aksoy 2014). Only when over the course of the legislative periods of the AKP (2002 until time of writing) Turkey intensified also its relationships to former Ottoman 'separatist territory', e.g. with Hungary or with Arabic states in the Middle East, discourse on a Neo-Ottoman foreign policy arose (Nick Danforth 2016).

5.3. Reasoning

This section attempted to show the phenomenology of a hegemonic 'master narrative' in Turkey which is rarely contested by alternative narratives of the past and/or identity politics and thus, 'ontologically secure'. Rumelili (2015) argued that with direct bearing on the constitution of Turkey's national politics, states reflect their Ontological Security inwards onto society and outwards onto other states and the international system. For Turkey, this Ontological Security is built through the 'recognition' of their nation by the West, and the state as 'strong' or 'honorable'. Simultaneously, the *memory* of the Turkish people, engaged in the hazardous struggle of the Liberation War (1919-1923), and disgraced by disloyalty of other ethnicities and a conspiracy of foreign powers against it (Sèvres Syndrome). Throughout our examination, we saw that [1] 'The Internal Unity By Integrity Theme' comprises a [1a] Separatist People Feature, [1b] Separatist Territory Feature, and [1c] National Unity Feature; whilst [2] 'The International Others Theme' encompasses questions of a [2a] Foreign Conspiracy Feature, an [2b] International Recognition Feature, and a [2c] Bloc Membership Feature. I will analyze in the following section President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches with regards to if and how he was appealing to those identity themes at the core of the Turkish identity.

6.   Counterterrorism Narratology

This section presents and analyzes how the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained/narrated Turkey's counterterrorism approach in Southeast Anatolia against the PKK, in northern Syria against PYD and in northern Iraq against YPG. Based on the themes and features developed in the preceding section 4 'Turkey's National Narrative Template' the following coding is used in square brackets when appeals to it are made:

The Internal Unity by Integrity Theme	The International Others Theme
[1a] Separatist People	[3a] Foreign Conspiracy *(Sèvres Syndrome)*
[1b] Separatist Territory	[3b] Recognition
[1c] National Unity	[3c] Bloc Membership

In subsection 5.1, the excerpts are presented in chronological order and grouped in four phrases, along a most similar design, concerning the frequency, content and intensity of the appeals made. A (1) 'no explanation phase' from 26 November 2015 to 30 December 2015, a (2) 'low and rising justification phase' from 31 December 2015 to 13 March 2016, a (3) 'high or climax justification phase' in the week between 14 March 2016 to 21 March 2016, and a (4) 'mediocre justification phase between 22 March 2016 and 22 May 2016'. For better understanding of their context it remains to be highlighted throughout that the related speeches were held in numerous and continuously changing locations, were directed at different audiences, and held under different political contexts (cf. section 1).

In subsection 5.2, the findings will be analyzed semiotically with respect to Erdoğan's rhetorical usage of 'opposition' and enthymemes (S), as an "incomplete or 'careless' logical inference" which is more plausible, likely, or probabilistic than binding (Feldmann 2004, 152). In terms of opposition, I search for: stylistic devices using victimization (V) or glorification (G), distinctions between friends (F) and enemies (E), as well as appeals to memory (M) and vision (A). In alliance with Berenskoetter's (2014) phenomenological approach to 'biographical narratives', memories are appeals to past experiences and 'vision'

accounts for appeals to future experiences aspired. The results of the analysis will be used for discussing the validity of the hypotheses built in subsection 2.6 in section 6.

6.1 Findings

6.1.1 Phase 1: 26 November 2015 to 30 December 2015

This phase is shaped by both no justification for Turkey's counterterrorism approaches in Southeast Anatolia circulated by *Hürriyet Daily News* and no appeal of Erdoğan to meta narrative features. Between 26 November and 30 December 2015, he focuses mostly on issues connected to northern Iraq despite the small-scale Istanbul Bayrampaşa explosion on December 1 and the Sabiha Gökçen bombing on 23 December 2015 being conducted by 'Kurdish militants' (The New York Times 2017).[20]

For illustration, up to 50,000 gathered on 29 November 2015 in the southeastern province Diyarbakır for commemorating the death of the head of the Diyarbakır office of Turkey's largest human rights organization, Tahir Elçi from the Bar Association. Elçi was shot one day before when holding a press conference that called for peace, after an unidentified gunman killed two police officers (Hürriyet Daily News 2015d). On December 2, 2015, Erdoğan attacked Russia which accused Turkey of buying oil from Daesh (Hürriyet Daily News 2015e). On December 27, he emphasizes friendly relations and the continuance of Turkish assistance to the fight against terror in northern Iraq when meeting with the Prime Minister Mustafa Barzani of Kurdistan's regional government (Hürriyet Daily News 2015h).

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[20] Interestingly enough, this continues in 2016 as well. On January 14, he condemns a group of 1,128 academics who signed a peace petition for the government to end its low intensity war in Southeast Anatolia called 'We won't be part of this crime', and accuses them of "publicly taking sides with the terror organization" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016c). One day later, the CHP slams the government for detaining 12 of them (Hürriyet Daily News 2016d).

6.1.2 Phase 2: 31 December 2015 to 13 March 2016

In 2016, we see an increase in explanatory speeches circulated by *Hürriyet Daily News*, and rising critical tension, yet only one narrative recursion.

On 31 December 2015, President Erdoğan vowed in his New Year's speech:

> [2b] 'The Republic of Turkey has the resources and [1a] determination to overcome the separatist terrorist organization. Our security forces are continuing to cleanse terrorists both from mountains and the cities and [A] they will continue to do so'. [… *Hürriyet Daily News* paraphrases that:] [2a, E] Without naming any country, Erdoğan said the PKK had become a puppet for all countries and dark institutions that nurture enmity toward Turkey and that he denounces any claims of Turkish ambitions of territorial gains in Iraq. […] We only want [1c] the people of our region, who are historically and culturally our brothers, to live in peace and security.
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2015i)

On January 6, when addressing around 400 village leaders at a meeting in his presidential palace he denounced that any 'Kurdish problem' prevails in Turkey:

> We closed this matter in my Diyarbakır speech in 2005, [1c, S] We said then, 'There is no such problem in Turkey anymore, you cannot explain this to anybody. There is a terror problem in Turkey.'
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016a)

On January 12, he spoke at an Ambassador's Conference in Ankara after the Sultanahmet suicide bombing conducted by Daesh in Istanbul:

> Is there [G] any other country that has struggles against the terrorist organization named Daesh in a more determined way than we do and [V] which has paid a higher price? […] [1c, S] This incident has showed once again that we have to stand in full unity [E] against terror. Turkey's resolute and principled position will continue. […] It makes no difference to us what their names and abbreviation are. [2b, S] The first target of all terrorist organizations in this region is Turkey because Turkey is struggling against all of them with the same resolution. [… *Hürriyet Daily News* paraphrases that:] [2c, E] The president has called on the international community, particularly the European nations, to fight harder against terrorist organizations and their sponsor bodies.
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016b)

On 20 January, Erdoğan promises in a presidential speech that there will be "no more talks" with the PKK and only ongoing security operations for liquidating them, as the opposition parties and particularly the HDP were demanding:

> We know that the only goal of [1b] the separatist terror organization is to fulfil the duty it has been tasked with by [E] its master and completing the contract it has been given. So, in the coming period, [A, E] neither the separatist terror organization, nor the party under its control, nor other structures will ever be accepted as counterpart. That affair is over. […] [S] Their organization, deputies and municipalities will answer to the judiciary for what they have done. [A] We will put the region back on its feet again, along with our nation. [A] We will sit with our nation and our citizens after our security

forces have entirely liquidated terrorists in the region and we will decide what is to be done for a radical solution to this issue. We will implement this.

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016e)

On February 23, five days after a blast in Ankara which killed around 30 people and wounded another 60, he referred to Syria as an 'exporter of terrorism' and reiterated at the forum of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey in Istanbul:

> The chaos in Syria has provided an environment for terrorist organizations like Daesh, al-Nusra, the PYD and the YPG to grow and disperse […] As Turkey we have been [1a] struggling with a separatist terror organization for 30 years. In our view, there is no difference between terrorist organizations. We do not discriminate between al-Shabab, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levent and al-Nusra, or between the Kurdistan Worker's Party [PKK], the Democratic Union Party [PYD] and the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units [YPG]. […] [V] Turkey, a country which feels the most pain of the Syrian-origin threats, is the most affected country by terror attacks. [… *Hürriyet Daily News* paraphrases that:] he said, calling the situation too heavy for Turkey to carry alone. [2c, F] Erdoğan repeated calls for the international community to take a 'common stance' [E] against terrorism, [S] adding that around 400,000 people have died and 12 million people have been displaced since the Syrian war erupted in 2011. [2b] 'As Turkey, we cannot remain silent about this tragedy happening in our neighborhood … [G] Turkey has been a voice of global conscience with its stance on the Syria problem and saved the honor of humanity," he said, [2b] adding that Turkey has hosted more than 3 million migrants.'

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016h)

Hürriyet Daily News did not report on any further statements which explain or justify counterterrorism made by president Erdoğan in this period.[21]

6.1.3 Phase 3: 14 March 2016 to 21 March 2016

After the second bombing on Kızılay square in Ankara on March 13 which left some 37-people dead and 125 wounded, we examine a tremendous and dense usage of counterterrorism speeches. This height lasts until two days after the suicide bombing at Istanbul's popular *Istiklal Caddesi* that killed 5 and wounded 36. On March 14, Erdoğan reiterates that Turkey had become a target for terrorist acts because of growing regional instability in recent years. After a victimization of the Turkish nation in this regard and

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[21] On March 3, Erdoğan labels a call of the HDP for a public demonstration in the curfew affected Sur district of Diyarbakir a 'call for terror' his "Kurdish brothers will not comply with" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016j); and Davutoğlu said that the HDP was "plotting against the country" and "collaborating with terrorists to drag Turkey into chaos (Hürriyet Daily News 2016i).

emphasizing of the common vision of a resilient Turkey that does not give up in its fight against terrorism, he draws a picture of a strong state:

> [A] Our state will never give up using its right of self-defense in the face of all kinds of terror threats. [G] All of our security forces, with its soldiers, police and village guards, have been conducting a determined struggle [E] against terror organizations [G] at the cost of their lives. […] [S] Our people should not worry, the struggle against terrorism will for certain end in success and terrorism will be brought to its knees.
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016k)

On the same day, he suggests during a dinner party for doctor's day in Ankara that Turkey's definition of 'terrorism' should be broadened to include 'accomplices' and 'supporters' for enhancing counterterrorism:

> [S] It's not only the person who pulls the trigger, but those who made that possible who [A] should also be defined as terrorists. […] Some circles, at home and abroad, are at a junction. [F] They will either side with us or [E] with terrorists. [S] There is no middle way.
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016l)

On March 15, whilst no identity of the perpetrator was confirmed, *Hürriyet Daily News* paraphrases and quotes Erdoğan at a meeting with Azerbaijan's president Aliyev:

> [M] The objective of this and other recent events were to spread fear in society to discourage it from [A] marching towards its goal of building a new Turkey. [S] 'But they will never be able to do so. […] This is impossible.'
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016m)

On March 16, he reiterates his call for broadening the terrorism definition and his motivation to strike Turkey's 'enemies' even harder:

> [A] If the state doesn't strike its iron fist in a velvet glove on the heads of terrorists, [A, V] they will continue hurting us each day. This issue has no relation to human rights, freedom of thought, freedom of press and democracy. Those who use these concepts along with 'terror' and 'terrorist' should know that [2b, V] they have been making our nation's conscience bleed. [… *Hürriyet Daily News* paraphrases that] [1c] Erdoğan said there was a need to form a "national coalition" [E] against all threats aimed at Turkey […] he slammed the country's media outlets which referred to [A] his ambitions for a presidential system in relation to the latest suicide car bomb attack [G, A, 1c] Saying 'Tayyip Erdoğan should go', means saying 'Let the mentality of having one nation, one flag, one homeland and one state on which we built our entire politics come down.
>
> (Hürriyet Daily News 2016n)

On March 17, we experience the second strongest 'biographical narrative', when Erdoğan's rhetoric directly relinks to the Kemalist past:

> Be sure that we did not allow and will not allow any steps that would hurt the souls of [G] martyrs or tear the hearts of our veterans. [1c] We are in [E] a uncompromising fight to the end against all terror organizations. […] [A] Sooner or later, we will annihilate all terrorists in this country with God's

permission. […]   [G] Since last July, more than 300 of our soldiers and police officers have been martyred. But do you know what we gained? We have shown both [F] our friends and [E] our enemies that [2a] these lands are our homeland. This was important. [S, G] This is such an achievement that we can compare it only with [M] the Battle of Gallipoli and [M] the War of Independence. […] [A] Believe me, if [E] these (deputies) get away with it, the resentment of [1c, G] our brothers who are currently fighting in the southeast and our brothers who have been martyred there would ruin us.

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016o)

On March 18, he accused 'Europe' of being and accomplice of the terror Turkey suffers compares Europe's struggle of hosting refugees with Turkey's counterterrorism:

These (countries) are not honest, not sincere and they are acing ambivalence. […] Whom are you deceiving? Be honest, be sincere. [2b] There is no Turkey or Turkish nation who will be deceived. The name of this is surrendering to terror. These (countries) surrendered to terror. […] [A, S] There Is no reason for the bomb, which exploded in Ankara, not to explode in Brussels […]. Despite this clear reality, European countries are paying no attention, as if they are dancing in a minefield. […] [A] The viper they are nourishing can bite you at any time. […] [G] At a time when Turkey is hosting 3 million (migrants), those who are unable to find space for a handful of refugees, who in the middle of Europe keep these innocents in shameful conditions, must first look at themselves. […] [1c] Our struggle [E] against terrorism is measured and legitimate […] [2a] Every terrorist organization active in our region and in Turkey has unified against Turkey. [2c] Many states, primarily Western countries, still cannot display a principient stance against these groups.

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016p)

On March 21, two days after the Istanbul suicide bombing on *Istiklal Caddesi*, Erdoğan describes the recent events as the "biggest and bloodiest wave of terror attacks in Turkish history" and makes the strongest utilization of the biographical master narrative, drawing on historical events, national unity, and the EU as an enemy. He uses even more historical events of national memory, aspect, aspect:

Of course, we know very well the fact that [E] terror organizations conduct [2a] attacks to enslave our country to their own bloody agenda and to drag our nation to intimidation. […] I am making a new mobilization call [E] against terrorism, [E] terrorist organizations and [E, 2a] those who want to tame our country through those organizations. [G] It is a call in the spirit of [M, G] the Battle of Malazgirt, of [M, G] the Anatolian Seljuk state founded in Iznik that peaked in Konya, of [M, G] the grandness of the supreme Ottoman plane tree planted in Söğüt that encompassed 24 million m2, of [M, G] the Dardanelles Campaign and [M, G] the War of Independence. […] [A, E] Turkey must not only fight against terrorism and terrorists but also against 'these powers that support them with false justifications. […].

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016q)

6.1.4 Phase 4: 22 March 2016 to 22 May 2016

The fourth phase is marked a shift in the major audience and less biographical narratives: instead of explaining/justifying Turkey's counterterrorism approach domestically, Erdoğan called for a united international approach against terror.[22]

On April 19, Erdoğan explained during a regular meeting with 'local chiefs' that

> [A, 1c] We cannot stop ongoing grievances without rooting out [1a] the terror organization, which is operating only to kill … along with its all figures and supporters, [2a] from the region and our country. […] [S] If you are looking for a resolution, here is the resolution. [A, 1c] When we root out [E] terror organization, without its smallest trace remaining, [1b] from these territories, then [A, 1c] we will have put the resolution into practice
>
> <div align="right">(Hürriyet Daily News 2016v).</div>

On April 25, Erdoğan said during his speech at the seventh United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) Global Forum in Baku:

> We have failed to show the common, resolved effort expected from us to [E] fight radical movements and the terror fed by these movements. […] We could not yet overcome the entrenched prejudices that have forced us to establish [2c] the Alliance of Civilizations and understanding that separates people relying on their beliefs, roots and cultures. […] [M] The world has failed to take a united stance against the pain caused by 'bomb after bomb that exploded in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, France, Pakistan, Turkey, and Belgium. […] [M] We failed to find a solution to political disputes, injustices, and inequalities which spawned an environment of violence […] [A] We must view members of all races as human beings and love them. Here, this constitutes the basis of peace in the world.
>
> <div align="right">(Hürriyet Daily News 2016w)</div>

On 17 May, when a dispute with the EU regarding the reformation of Turkey's terrorism laws was at its height, Erdoğan said at the third Islamic Conference of Ministers responsible for water in Istanbul:

> We always say this; the biggest problem in the world today is not terror itself. [E] The biggest problem of the world today is the hypocritical, two-faced, insincere attitude in the face of terror organizations. […] [3] States which exercise control over the world's arms Industry give their weapons to terrorists. I challenge them to deny this. By now, we all know which countries supply arms to which terror groups. […] You can be sure that tomorrow, the same weapons will be used against the countries which

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[22] On March 31, discussed anti-terror operations with US Secretary of State John Kerry at a state visit in Washington, particularly the Turkish request for the anti-ISIS cooperation not to cooperate with the PYD in Syria (Tolga Tanis 2016). On April 18, he condemned Islamist terror organizations operating outside of Turkey, i.e. Daesh and al-Qaeda, as inflicting the greatest harm on Islam as a religion. Instead splitting into Shia and Sunni, Muslims should unite under 'Islam's integrating roof' and foster cooperation within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC.) (Hürriyet Daily News 2016u).

provided them. […] [2c] (There are reactions when bombs explode) in Paris, Brussels but not in Lahore, Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakır. This is why we are hurt.

(Hürriyet Daily News 2016x)

On 20 May, two days before the end of Davutoğlu's premiership, Erdoğan approves the 'benchmark law' regarding the EU visa liberalizations (Hürriyet Daily News 2016y).

6.2 Summary of Findings

The table below shows the total numbers of each feature during each phase of this small-n investigation of *Hürriyet Daily News* circulation of counterterrorism speeches by President Erdoğan. They will be discussed in section 6.

Feature	Phase 1 (26.11.15- 30.12.15)	Phase 2 (31.12.15 -13.03.16)	Phase 3 (14.03.16—21.3.16)	Phase 4 (22.3.16-22.05.16)	Total
Total Speech number	3	5	8	3	19
[M, A] Biographical Narratives	0	0	3	1	4
[1a] Separatist People	0	2	0	1	3
[1b] Separatist Territory	0	0	0	1	1
[1c] National Unity	0	3	5	0	8
[2a] (Foreign) Conspiracy	0	1	4	1	6
[2b] Honorable State	0	3	3	0	6
[2c] Bloc Membership	0	2	0	2	4
[M] Memory	0	0	8	2	10
[A] Vision	0	4	11	4	19
[V] Victimization	0	2	2	0	4
[G] Glorification	0	2	14	0	16
[F] Friend	0	1	2	0	3
[E] Enemy	0	6	13	3	22
[S] Enthymeme	0	6	6	3	15
Total	0	32	68	17	117

Table 1: Summary of Findings

7.   Discussion of Findings

From the findings, we can draw insight regarding the three hypotheses posed in section 2.7 as well as discuss their implications for current controversies among Ontological In-/Security scholarship. This section will discuss each in turn and reconnect it to the title of this study 'do you like it shaken or stirred?'.

7.1 Implications for Generated Hypotheses

First, does the investigated media outlet *Hürriyet Daily News* distribute a devise narrative articulated by president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan when he is explaining Turkey's counterterrorism approach (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016)?

Drawing from the small-*n* investigated 16 speech excerpts, we can say that terrorists, terror organizations and increasingly throughout the phases also their accomplices, are constructed as enemies and surmount to Erdoğan's most frequently used narrative feature (22 appeals). The hegemonic national unity narrative feature, however, accounts to only 8 appeals. Further allusion takes place in terms of international bloc membership (4 appeals) and 'friends' (3 appeals). A devise narrative was indeed adopted and circulated on 14 March 2016, when he suggested at a dinner party for the celebration of 'doctor's day', one day after a major blast in Ankara occurred, that "some circles, at home and abroad, are at a junction. They will either side with us or with terrorists. There is no middle way" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016l). He argued that the objective of the Ankara blast that targeted civilians in the heart of the capital was not vengeance as TAK claimed for TSK's full-fledged war in Southeast Anatolia, but "to spread fear in society to discourage it from marching towards its goal of building a new Turkey" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016m). As he equals the criticism of 'Tayyip Erdoğan should go' to 'let the mentality of having one nation, one flag, one homeland and one state on which we built our entire politics come down', it occurs that he positions himself as the spokesperson of the nation and 'the national will' (*milli irade*). This confirms Akkoyunlu and Öktem's (2016) premise regarding the AKP using 'their majority' in terms of Rousseau's democratic dilemma, namely that their 49,50% election results

(November 2015) allow a single party rule without having to consider any opposition parties.

The distinction between 'us' as 'the national unity' behind and/or called for that supports AKP's counterterrorism politics and 'them' as separatists, non-supporters, or enemies is further perpetuated through Erdoğan's depictions of the Turkish state, Turkish nation and/or government as an honorable (6 appeals) victim (4 appeals) fighting terrorism, although other crises like 1.7 million refugees on Turkish soil and an instability spill-over from the war in Syria. Whilst Erdoğan called for a synergized international approach with the EU and the US in the fight against terror in phase 2, his target group shifts in phase 3 towards Turkish citizens, for that a 'national coalition' is to be formed (Hürriyet Daily News 2016m). Both types of calls decrease rapidly during phase 2, arguably not only to the less amount of data investigated, but because his political focal points switched. Namely from 'the West' who criticizes Turkey over her terrorism approaches (Chase Winter 2016), position towards the participation of Kurdish forces in the anti-Daesh coalition (Tolga Tanis 2016) and the visa liberation dispute with the EU (Hürriyet Daily News 2016y) towards the Islamic Conference of Minister's responsible for water (17 May 2016) and the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations' global Forum in Turkey's ally state Azerbaijan (25 April 2016).

Second, does this devise narrative contest master narrative features in terms of Berenskoetter's (2014) notion of 'biographical narratives'? For Berenskoetter (2014, 270, 279) a 'biographical narrative' (embeds individuals in 'national consciousness' by providing a 'basic discourse' of a hegemonic 'master narrative' and 'political potency'. Open to societal contestation, biographical narratives look both backward on memories and forward on visions. Thereby, they "seek to locate the Self in the past and the future" (ibid., 15). When we look at the total number of memorial (past) and visionary (future) appeals Erdoğan made and *Hürriyet Daily News* circulated, they account for the second most frequently (19 appeals for 'vision') and fourth most frequently (10 appeals for 'memory') used features. As Feldman *et al.* (2004, 152) outlined that elements of a narrative acquire meaning through what they are contrasted with something and sometimes even only when this is the case,

and Berenskoetter (2014) outlined that biographical narratives function as a bridge between past and future, let us take a closer look at some exemplary speech excerpts where both appeals are made.

Out of the four speeches fulfilling this condition, three are located in phase 3 (March 15, March 17, March 21) and one in phase 4 (April 25). The first biographical narrative speech occurred on March 15, when Erdoğan recalled the recently happened terror attack and claimed, as already mentioned above, that its intention must have been to spread fear and to discourage the Turkish society to march 'towards its goal of building a new Turkey'. Thereby, he appeals to AKP's *New Turkey* 2023 vision (Hürriyet Daily News 2016m).[23] To what extent AKP's vision departs from the early Republican examined in section 4, remains to be done elsewhere.[24]

The second biographical narrative speech was given on March 17. Here, Erdoğan first illustrated his vision of "annihilat[ing] all terrorists in this country with God's permission" and glorified the death of 300 soldiers and police officers as martyrs, before he connected it to the Battle of Gallipoli (April 1915- January 1916) and the Liberation War (1919-1923) (Hürriyet Daily News 2016o). The Battle of Gallipoli "is said to have given birth to a national consciousness" (ibid.) that resulted in the National Struggle lead by Atatürk. According to Erdoğan, by fighting against terrorists and the 'martyr' lives given, Turkey showed both friends and enemies that her territory is Turkey's only (Hürriyet Daily News 2016o).

The third circulated biographical narrative speech was given on March 21, 2016, two days after a suicide bombing in Istanbul's popular *Istiklal Caddesi* and just nine days after the car bombing in Ankara's city center. Here, he starts with building enmity against 'terror organizations' in general, claiming they would conduct so "to enslave our country to their own bloody agenda and to grad our nation to intimidation" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016r) and further uses a threat climax for his mobilization call "against terrorism, terrorist

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[23] For information on AKP's Yeni Türkiye vision, see "2023 Political Vision", last modified 30 September 2012, https://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/2023-political-vision.

[24] For an introduction on this issue, see Charlotte Joppien, "A Reinterpretation of Tradition?", Conference Paper presented to the Australian Association for Research in Education, May 2011.

organizations, and those who want to tame our country through those organizations" (ibid.). Subsequently, he connects this call to much more memorial incidents and phases of Turkish history than on March 17, which goes beyond the developed master narrative and therefore contests it: "the Battle of Malazgirt, [...] the Anatolian Seljuk state [...], the grandness of the supreme Ottoman plane tree, [and again] the Dardanelles Campaign [= Battle of Gallipoli] and the War of Independence" (ibid.). In a third step, he uses 'repetition' for emphasizing his vision of the counterterrorism call: "Turkey must not only fight against terrorism and terrorists but also against 'these powers that support them with false justifications'" (ibid.).

The fourth and last BN speech excerpt was given about a month later on 25 April 2016 at the UNAOC Global Forum in Baku. In this regard, one must surely emphasize the international nature of his audience for his diplomatic and normative rhetoric. We find some three- to fivefold anaphor: "We have failed to show [...] We could not yet [...] The world has failed to take [...]. We failed to find [... and] We must view" (Hürriyet Daily News 2016w). Therein, he puts the fight against "radical movements and the terror fed by these movements" in line with religious and cultural understanding, solidarity with non-/Western bombing victims and the failure to solve political disputes, injustices, and inequalities "which spawned an environment of violence" (ibid.). From the developed master narrative in section 4, we cannot scrutinize how 'radical movements' and 'bombing victims' were incorporated into the state biography.

In sum, we find that the 15 March and 21 March biographical narrative speeches differ from the 'master narrative', whilst the March 17 speech is confirmatory, and the April 25 speech remains untestable within the scope of this study.

Third, were biographical narratives de-/activated for justifying unpopular policy choices in phases of Ontological Insecurity (cf. Subotić 2016)? One may argue that in the divisive biographical narrative speech from 15 March 2016 the collective memory of the determined Liberation War was deactivated and replaced with the activated yet controversial vision of AKP's *Yeni Türkiye* 2023 (Hürriyet Daily News 2016l). In the confirmatory 17 March biographical narrative speech, the early Republican features of the meta narrative were

active for justifying the annihilation of "all terrorists in this country with God's permission". In the differing biographical narrative speech from 21 March, the meta narrative's memorial phases were extended and therefore contested for strengthening Erdoğan's mobilization call "against terrorism, terrorist organizations and those who want to tame our country through those organizations." Whilst the latter conspiracy appeals to the *Sèvres Syndrome* features, it does not speak of a territorial division but toxic international influence. The fourth biographical narrative speech from April 25 remains untestable towards these ends.

If we consider Turkey's counterterrorism approach as unpopular among certain parts of its society (e.g. ideal typical CHP, HDP voters along the critique lines of the party leaders, see section 1), we may consider AKP voters as supporting the counterterrorism approach. Drawing the biographical narrative-picture further, we may claim that both interest groups' tastes were fulfilled. One has to take into further account that AKP, CHP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) signed a joint anti-terror declaration on 15 March 2016 (BBC Türkce 2016). If we recognize the domestic and international criticism Erdoğan faced for his country's counterterrorism approaches, we may label particularly the phase between March 2016 and May 2016 as ontologically insecure. For significant results towards this hypothesis, however, a larger-n study should be conducted.

7.2 Implications for Ontological In-/Security Studies

Which implications can we draw from Turkey's counterterrorism narration for Ontological In-/Security Studies? According to Giddens (1991, 63; emphasis added), "competent agents routinely '*keep in touch' with* the grounds [reasons] of their behavior." As I have elaborated in section three, Ontological In-/Security scholarship contemporary diverges along two major controversy. The first is whether identity needs supplement to (Browning and Joenniemi 2016, 5; McSweeney 1999) or trump (Mitzen 2006, 350) a state's physical needs. Jelena Subotic's (2016, 610) adoption of Ontological In-/Security Theory to the case of Serbia's Kosovo Question argued that the need for a continuous 'identity' functions as a bridge for a "policy change that resolves the [a] physical security challenge" when narratives are strategically activated and deactivated. Considering the long history of the Kurdish Question in Turkey and the fact that there was actually a peace process attempt just prior

to the eruption of violence in Summer 2015, based on the findings of this study we can thus argue that also a 'policy return' under a physical security challenge may be justified with the strategic employment of biographical narratives.

The previous small-n counterterrorism narrative analysis showed that despite all prevalent arguments regarding Turkey's *Sèvres Syndrome* the narrative of 'unity by integrity' was not adopted in its original form but modified when political tensions surrounding the terrorist attacks in Turkey as well as Turkey's counterterrorism approach against the PKK changed: A conviction that draws on the foreign occupation memories of the 1920s as an "an international conspiracy to weaken and divide Turkey"(Kardaş and Balci 2016, 162) also included 'foreign influence' over Turkey. According to Erdoğan's narrative, this foreign influence is not necessarily interested in a territorial but a social division of Turkey. This suggests for the second major division of contemporary Ontological Security Studies that a state's 'sense of self' is reflexive and not consistent for a state that sought to provide a ontological secure identity in the first place (cf. Zarakol 2016).

Finally, we see that Erdoğan translated the popular criticisms the by-then political leadership of Turkey faced because of the terror attacks that occurred in metropoles as existential threats for the Turkish nation-state. Thus, the hardcase of Turkey investigated in this dissertation suggests for the intellectual debate among Ontological In-/Security scholars that 'physical threats' not trump 'identity threats' but actually may even be (re-)interpreted as such. Furthermore, by bridging memory and vision in critical moments, a consistent feeling of biographical continuity was temporarily created that arguably allowed for governmental forces to create the coherent narrative of a strong Turkey that is doing what is needed to maintain its order (Laing 1960, 107). Browning and Joenniemi (2016, 18) found that if a 'self' possesses the *reflexive* ability "to step back, employ alternative channels of articulation and opt for some other identity" (Browning and Joenniemi 2016, 18) desecuritization of an 'identity' under threat would be possible (Zarakol 2016, 3; Rumelili 2015, 3; Mälksoo 2015, 225). Since Erdoğan adopted a rather divisive narrative between 'Turks' and 'separatists / terrorists' as well as 'Turks' and 'foreign entities that do not support Turkey's actions', however, one can argue that reflexive abilities of state-selves may also involve the creation of a more aggressive state narrative.

Zarakol (2016, 14) already challenged the dominant window that all states *seek* Ontological Security and argued that this is only true for those states who said to *provide* a secure identity for their nation. She believes that states who provide Ontological Security seem more recognizable in their competence as 'states' and surmises that this leads others to view them as 'sovereign'. Since the narrative of Ontological In-/Security Erdoğan provided in the given case under investigation here was mostly directed at domestic audiences, we may thus argue that he did not seek to create domestic trust in the competences of the by-then government. Rather, he used (biographical) to explain and justify Turkey's various counterterrorism approaches domestically and to further introduce his vision of a 'new Turkey' (*Yeni Türkiye*). Internationally, he, at first, utilized the momentum and narratives to gather support for Turkey's policies before he in late March 2016, when these attempts turned out unsuccessful, depicted foreign absence of that as a (further) wedge between Turkey and 'the West'.

7.3 Suggestions for Future Research

The case of Turkey's fight against the PKK and the narratives Erdoğan employed to frame those point towards a series of fruitful avenues for future research. First, as there was found a significant relationship between the 'narratives' a statesman used and the policies his state pursued, scholars should investigate whether and to which extents this is the case in other constituencies and regime types. Second, for the specific case of Turkey, an investigation into the narratives employed for a longer period of investigation that spans e.g. from the resurgence of armed conflict with the PKK[25] to the constitutional referendum that was held in April 2017 on 18 proposed amendments that included the abolishment of the role of the Prime Minister in favor of a strengthened President with all executive powers. Furthermore, an intra-state comparison to the rhetoric of by-then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and/or with regards to the other organizations introductory mentioned to be part of the 'terror cocktail', i.e. DAESH and FETÖ, as well as a inter-state comparison to other

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[25] It is disputed whether those commenced in 2014, April 2015, June 2015 or July 2015.

countries that also experienced terrorist attacks during the same period, such as the Russian Federation, France, or Lebanon, would be insightful. With regards to the former, it can be speculated that Davutoğlu adopted a similar if not identical narrative to Erdoğan when explaining Turkey's counterterrorism approach in the given period, as he, for example, on 1 February 2016, said on a state visit in Riyadh:

> Launching operations on July 23 [last year] was a righteous decision. […] When you look at the amount of weapons seized, it is 11 tons in Sur [a district in Diyarbakir] alone. […] It is obvious why weapons have also been taken to Cizre and Silopi [two districts in Şırnak]. They are there just to put Turkey in the wheel of fire. If we hadn't started these operations and make brave decisions, the results of such a build-up would be worrying. […] Such a correct decision should now be backed by correct processes. [Hürriyet Daily News further paraphrases that:] 'many foreign snipers' were noted during the anti-PKK operations, claiming that 'their aim is to stir up Turkey.'

I further speculate that the narratives and practices that target(ed) other ingredients of the introductory mentioned 'terror cocktail' such as (alleged) members of the 'Gülen Movement' (FETÖ) particularly from Summer 2016 onwards follow the same pattern while those for DAESH did not.

8.　Conclusion

Do you like it shaken or stirred? This study investigated how narratives, in general, and biographical narratives as the connection between past and future experiences (Berenskoetter 2014), in particular, were used by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for justifying Turkey's armed fight against the PKK during the period of the 64th Turkish cabinet (26 November 2015 to 22 May 2016). If anything, it advocates to extend the pursuit of 'narratology' as a means for treating 'blind spots' in IR's academic composition and particularly Ontological In-/Security Studies. The set of questions around the reasons for nations going to war, for enhancing their security measures or for their behavior in moments or periods of insecurity are as old as the discipline of International Relations itself. Ontological Security Studies and biographical narratives may not trump traditionalist's Westphalian map but definitely assist us in understanding both the domestic processes that lead to an 'identity' becoming reshaped and, for better or worse, its possible impact on office holder's politics.

Turkey's 'counterterrorism' narration towards the PKK was used as a hardcase for testing three hypotheses in an integrative attempt. First, it developed a hegemonic 'master narrative' of the Republic of Turkey by drawing extensively from literature from and on the countries history. Thereby, the early Republican period of the 1920s and particularly two overarching themes were identified as pivotal: The 'Unity by Integrity' and the 'International Others' theme. When investigating if and how President Erdoğan refers to this hegemonic identity narrative of Turkey in speeches that were circulated by *Hürriyet Daily News*, it was found that his appeals converge and diverge with different intensity in correlation with the density of terror attacks that Turkey experienced. That is to say that, he used more narratives that appealed to both past memories and glories of the Turkish nation as well as past memories of the Ottoman Empire and his vision for Turkey's future (*Yeni Türkiye 2023*) that are not part of the hegemonic narrative but form an alternative to it in periods of particular political stress. Furthermore, his rhetoric became afterwards more divisive by distinguishing between an 'us' in form of an inter-/national union that is (imagined to be) supportive of Turkey's fight against the PKK and a 'them' in form of 'opponents' such as non-supportive nations as well as terrorist organizations and their accomplices themselves.

Thereby, this dissertation found the traumatic 'Sèvres Syndrome' as having been modified, from an anxiety of Turkey being spatially divided to an anxiety of Turkey being socially divided concerning the regime and its politics. The results strongly highlight an exploitation of phases of 'Ontological Insecurity' for reshaping (domestic) politics. This points towards fruitful future avenues for research in the fields of International Relations, in general, and our understanding of ambiguous policies adopted by (semi-/authoritarian) governments in particular. In this regard, it was suggested to explore intra- and inter-state comparisons with regards to the by-then Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoğlu and/or countries that also experienced terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 and subsequently adopted various and varying counterterrorism approaches, such as the Russian Federation, France, and Lebanon.

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