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Public Attitudes Towards the EU After Brexit: What Can We Conclude From This?

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Introduction: A Brief Review

Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union (EU), noted in his memoirs that Europe would be built through crises and that it would be the sum of their solutions (1978: 46). With regard to the EU specifically and European integration generally, the recent decade should also be described as a “decade of crises” (Schimmelfennig 2018: 969). This ongoing period has included a number of EU-wide crises that have each, to a certain extent, affected the foundations upon which the EU has been built. Taken together, these crises have severely challenged the system persistence capabilities of the EU as a political system, to use Easton’s classic terms (1965), as the future existence of the EU has now become openly questionable. Before the birth of the modern EU with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) argued that there was something of a “permissive consensus” from the European public towards European integration. Their main argument was that as long as European integration did not cause any harm there was no reason for the European public to be concerned about its development. However, after the Maastricht Treaty transformed the EU into something starting to resemble a semi-political EU, instead of mainly a European common market, this has changed. For every new treaty since Maastricht, more and more decision-making powers have continued to be transferred to Brussels from the member states, a process that has not been equally supported by the European public as it has been by the political elites.

Because of the mismatch between elite and public preferences regarding European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2008) declared the end of the “permissive consensus” period of European integration. Instead they declared the start of a period of “constraining dissensus” from the European public towards European integration. However, already the referendum regarding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark had shown that the European public had both the ability, and sometimes also the willingness, to forestall deeper European integration (Anderson 1998: 570). Nevertheless, it came as a surprise for the EU bureaucrats when the attempt of creating a European constitution in 2005 failed after it had been voted down in popular

referendums in both France and the Netherlands. And that although the making of a European constitution was supported by an elite consensus within both countries. This constituted for the first time that the EU was visibly forced to retreat from the path towards full European political integration. After this defeat, it has no longer been possible for the political elites to ignore what the European public actually thinks about the EU. What should still have constituted a fresh new start for the EU with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 instead coincided with what has been referred to as the greatest economic recession since the great depression in the 1930s (Piketty 2014: 472).

The global financial recession, usually referred to as the “financial crisis”, also got a European offshoot with the start of the so-called Euro crisis, or the “European sovereign debt crisis”, in 2010. These two economic crises had a direct negative impact on the public perceptions of the EU within most member states, as many national political leaders chose to blame the national shortcomings on the EU and the Euro. However, it has already been the common procedure of national level politicians to blame the implementation of unpopular decisions on Brussels (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter & Streeck 1996: 150). This procedure was also clearly visible within the member states most heavily affected by the economic crises, such as Greece and Italy. Studies have also shown that individuals personally affected by the economic crises were more likely to shift from supporting a mainstream pro-European to a more Eurosceptic alternative during the elections (Hobolt & de Vries 2016). Therefore, it was no surprise that at the height of the Euro crisis between March 2011 and March 2013 every single European election was predominantly about the response to the Euro crisis and only 2 out of 15 elections during that period of time confirmed the incumbent government (Schimmelfennig 2014). What the European public thinks about the EU specifically, European integration generally and about concrete European integration policies like the Euro has ever since been high on the academic and political agenda. Especially now, when the EU seems to be standing at a crossroads with the upcoming European Parliament (EP) elections coinciding with the departure of the United Kingdom (UK), it should be deemed especially important to also take into account the European public preferences regarding what should, or should not, happen next in terms of European integration.

After the latest EP election of 2014, the traditional composition of the EP changed with a heavy influx of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). There has ever since been a lot of speculation to what extent this trend will continue in spring 2019, although no one expects that the total proportion of electoral support for Eurosceptic political parties will decline. The upcoming EP elections will also be the first not to include the UK, as a majority of the British public narrowly chose to turn their backs on Europe with the Brexit vote in June 2016. However, after the Brexit vote it has again become quite apparent that public attitudes towards the EU actually matter. More importantly though, the Brexit vote showed that there is a real political alternative of leaving the EU through the guidelines articulated in Article 50 in the Lisbon Treaty. With this, as a general background, the EU is approaching what is surely going to be an indicative year in terms of its future development. Taking the Brexit referendum as a benchmark event, the aim of this analysis is to take a closer look at how member state levels of public attitude towards the EU have developed since the 2016 Brexit vote. The main purpose is to look at the broader picture regarding intra-EU variations and trends in public attitudes during the intra-EP election period of 2014-2018 and to connect the broad findings with the Brexit vote.

What Do We Know So Far?

The main part of the headlines after the EP elections of 2014 revolved around the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties. If one agrees with the assumption that “politicians in democratic societies generally follow voter preferences” (Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz 2012: 118), public attitudes force political parties to adapt their positions based on the public preferences (Toshkov 2011: 171). Hence, the electoral gains for Eurosceptic political parties might just be a natural political consequence of changing public preferences. The concept of Euroscepticism although needs some clarification. According to the definition used by Pirro and Taggart (2018: 256; Taggart 1998: 366), Euroscepticism “expresses the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”. Within the EU literature, the concept of Euroscepticism is also usually divided into two different forms of Euroscepticism: hard or soft. According to the widely

adopted distinction proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004: 3-4), “hard Euroscepticism” is characterized by an “outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining member of the EU”. “Soft Euroscepticism” is on the other hand characterized by a “contingent or qualified opposition to European integration”. According to Pirro and Taggart, most political parties that are usually referred to as “Eurosceptic” are closer to being “soft Eurosceptic”, although it is difficult to identify the specific threshold for when a political party goes from being soft to being hard Eurosceptic.

According to an overview presented by Hobolt and de Vries (2016), 19 per cent of the European electorate voted for a Eurosceptic party in 2014. As a result, 220 out of 751 MEPs elected represented a Eurosceptic party, which accounted for 29 per cent of the total EP. Based on Hobolt’s (2015) classification of Eurosceptic parties that either got over two per cent of the votes or one MEP, there were altogether 66 political parties with a Eurosceptic profile that managed to get either one or both. Out of these, the overwhelming majority were classified as right-wing Eurosceptic parties (45), but there was also a significant amount classified as left-wing Eurosceptic parties (21). Since then, there have been parliamentary elections conducted within all the member states of the EU. In 2018, there have been five national governments that are being led by Eurosceptic political parties: Greece (“Syriza”), Italy (“Five Star Movement”), Poland (“Law and Justice party”), Hungary (“Fidesz”) and Latvia (“Union of Greens and Farmers”). Besides that, Eurosceptic political parties also have cabinet members in the governments of five other countries: Austria (“Freedom Party”), Bulgaria (“Ataka”), the Netherlands (“Christian Union”), Portugal (“Left Bloc”) and Estonia (“EKRE”). Not to forget that Eurosceptic political parties are also acting as supporting parties for the government in both Denmark (“Danish People’s Party”) and Spain (“Podemos”). It is also important to note that the migration crisis in 2015 has been shown to cause a direct negative effect on party politics towards European integration within the EU-area (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2018).

In this analysis, the focus is on what has happened with regard to public attitudes towards the EU during the period of 2014-2018. To take a closer look at what has happened, six figures have been included with descriptive statistics regarding how public attitudes have developed within the EU during this period. As the EU, at least at the

moment of writing, still consists of 28 separate countries, the trends in public attitudes are summarized in the context of six groups (and the UK as a specific entity for comparative reasons). The EU-27ⁱ consists of the remaining member states of the EU, divided also into the EU-14ⁱⁱ, which consists of the 14 old member states, and the EU-13ⁱⁱⁱ, which consists of the new post-2004 member states. The Eurozone^{iv} consists of the 19 member states also being part of the monetary union, and the non-Eurozone^v consists of the eight countries that are still not part of it. The non-Eurosceptic government^{vi} group consists of the 22 member states that are currently not being led by a political party classified by Hobolt (2015) as “Eurosceptic”, and the Eurosceptic government^{vii} group consists of the five countries that are currently being led by a Eurosceptic political party. Member state specific values are summarized in the Appendix.

For the overview regarding public attitudes, the European Commission’s official survey data, provided by the Eurobarometer (EB), is used. The so-called Standard EB surveys are conducted biannually since 1973, with around 1000 respondents per member state per survey and with the survey data gathered through face-to-face interviews.^{viii} Hence, since the 1970s, the EB surveys have been used as a key source within comparative studies related to public attitudes towards the EU (Cram 2012: 73). With regard to the EB surveys used in this analysis, the EB survey from 2014 was conducted two months prior to the EP elections, and the EB survey from 2016 was conducted one month prior to the Brexit referendum. Therefore, it should be possible to take into account, at least to some extent, both the development since the latest EP elections as well as the direct impact of the Brexit vote on public attitudes. However, it is more difficult to account for the effect of the migration crisis during 2015, as it was an ongoing event stretching over a longer period. To fulfil the general purpose with this analysis, two indicators measuring public attitudes directly towards the functioning of the EU, two indicators measuring public attitudes towards more existential aspects of the EU, and two indicators measuring public attitudes related to topics that have been heavily discussed within the EU at the time, have been used. This in order to present a broader perspective, which is necessary as public attitudes towards the EU have been shown to be multidimensional (Boomgarden, Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese 2011), indicating that the European public differs between aspects of the EU.

Starting with public attitudes towards the functioning of the EU, the staples in Figure 1 reflect the proportion thinking that the EU in general is going in the right direction within the various groups. The survey item used to measure public attitudes towards the functioning of the EU reflects an overall assessment regarding the performance of the EU. Based on Figure 1, it is quite apparent that since the Brexit vote there has been a shift in public attitudes towards the EU's perceived performance, as each group has turned more positive. Comparing the levels of 2016 with 2018, the European public is today more positive towards the EU's performance in all of the 27 remaining member states.^{ix}




Figure 1. Public support for the EU's current direction 2014-2018.^x

As the EP elections are around the corner, it is also relevant to look at what the European public thinks about the performance of the EP specifically. The EP elections have however already since the first elections in 1979 been perceived within academia as second-order elections (Reif & Schmitt 1980), with also the turnout being in constant decline since 1979. Still, the importance of the EP as a political institution has been increasing with every new treaty. According to a constitutional change in the Lisbon Treaty's article 17, the results of the EP elections should also be "taken into account" when selecting Jean-Claude Juncker's successor as the next Commission President, commonly referred to as the *Spitzenkandidat*-system (Hobolt 2015). Through the processual change the main idea was that the EP elections would become more personalized, as each political group within the EP would bring forward their own lead

candidates for the Commission Presidency. However, with regard to the 2019 EP elections, the European Council has so far refused to confirm that they will abide by this system also this time around.

Political trust is within the literature referred to as “the glue that keeps the system together” as well as “the oil that lubricates the policy machine” (Van der Meer 2010: 76). Therefore a sufficient level of trust in the EP is of great importance if the EP is to be perceived as a legitimate political institution. High levels of trust in the EP should also increase the political leverage of the EP towards the European Council and the European Commission. What is apparent when looking at Figure 2 is that the levels of trust in the EP have risen significantly since the Brexit vote, as over 60 per cent within the EU-27 now express their trust in the EP.




Figure 2. Levels of trust in the European Parliament 2014-2018.^{xi}

Continuing with the two indicators used to measure public attitudes towards more existential aspects of the EU, one related to the membership in the EU and one related to its development. There has been a lot of speculation after the Brexit vote regarding which country could be the next to leave the EU if given the possibility in a referendum. Although it is difficult to measure public attitudes towards leaving, the survey item used here to measure public support for leaving the EU is, at least to some extent, sufficient as the survey item asks whether the respondents think that the country’s future would be better outside the EU. Even though the survey item does not ask specifically whether the respondents want their countries to leave the EU, it is possible to presume that if a

respondent thinks that one's country would be better off outside the EU, the respondent should support an exit if given the opportunity. Even though this might not necessarily be true in every case, the results at least suggest to what direction the public leans within the different countries.

As is illustrated in Figure 3, the levels of public support for leaving the EU have been at around 50 per cent in the UK during the last five years, and this indicator should also reflect the levels of public attitude towards leaving the EU within the rest of the EU. This especially if taking into account that 51.9 per cent of the British electorate voted for the Brexit in 2016. Looking at the rest of the EU, around 30 per cent seemingly support an exit, but within countries that have a Eurosceptic government the level is almost at 40 per cent. There are also apparent differences between the EU-14 group and the EU-13 group, as well as between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone countries. Still, there is not a majority in favour of EU exit within any other country than the UK, even though 46 per cent of the population in Austria, Italy and Slovenia expressed support for leaving the EU in the most recent survey from 2018.




Figure 3. Public support for leaving the EU 2014-2018.^{xii}

Since the election of French President Emmanuel Macron, there has been a lot of talk about deeper European integration and transforming the EU, especially in the fields of defence and finance. Even though Macron so far has not been able to achieve anything concrete at the European level (and does not have anything more than moral support for his ambitions from other heads of government), his ambitions still seem to be in line with

European public attitudes. As illustrated in Figure 4, there is a clear majority in favour of deeper European integration, or at least for what is vaguely defined as “more decision-making” at the European level. Even though the headlines concerning the EU during the last decade has been about the EU being in crisis and close to dissolution, when the European public is taken into account the future is perhaps not as bleak. If comparing the findings presented in Figure 4 with the findings in Figure 3, they broadly illustrate that for every European wanting less Europe there are two who want more.




Figure 4. Public support for deeper European integration 2014-2018.^{xiii}

To round off the descriptive part of this analysis, the focus is now on two specific issues that have been high on the political agenda during the intra-EP election period of 2014-2018: global trade and immigration. Especially since the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the USA and the EU stalled, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU almost stalled, there have been small signs that the European public might be turning against globalization. Based on the findings presented in Figure 5 that does not, however, seem to be true, as around 70 per cent of the EU-27 agree with the statement that globalization provides opportunities for economic growth.




Figure 5. Public support for globalisation 2014-2018.^{xiv}

Since the migration crisis in 2015, during which over 1.3 million refugees entered the EU in one year, immigration has been at the centre of political debates within Europe. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2018) recently also identified immigration as one of four frames through which the future of the EU will be contested. As there are no border controls within the Schengen area, the immigration issue can only be solved at the European level under the current circumstances, if the policy of free movement within Europe is to be continued. However, when it comes to public attitudes towards immigration, there are obvious differences within the EU that largely explains the policies towards immigration within the countries, as many countries simply refused to take in immigrants during the migration crisis. As illustrated in Figure 6, the European public within the old EU-14 countries is largely in favour of immigration, while not even 30 per cent within the EU-13 think immigrants contribute to society. This also illustrates how difficult it will be to find an EU-wide solution for this problem, as not many Eastern European governments are likely to be re-elected if they would suddenly change their countries immigration policies in opposition to public preferences.




Figure 6. Public support for immigration 2014-2018.^{xv}

Final Remarks

It is important to be careful when speculating about political consequences based on shifting public attitudes, but it is quite difficult based on this overview not to conclude that the European public seems to have gotten more positive towards the EU after the Brexit vote. This should constitute positive news for traditional pro-European political parties all over Europe. It is also important to point out that the general EU positive trend is also reflected by higher levels of public support for deeper European integration, globalization and immigration during this period. Interestingly, the British public is also generally more in favour of both globalization and immigration than the EU average, and hence it is perhaps not nativism or anti-capitalism that researchers should look at when trying to find the main reasons behind the Brexit vote. On the other hand, within the other countries that are being led by Euroseptic governments, the public is more negative towards globalization (and significantly more negative towards immigration) than countries that have got non-Euroseptic governments. What to make of that is unfortunately not within the scope of this analysis.

Notes

1. EU-27 group includes: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Germany.
2. EU-14 group includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and Germany.
3. EU-13 group includes: Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
4. Eurozone group includes: Austria, Belgium, Republic of Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Germany.
5. Non-Eurozone group includes: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Sweden.
6. Non-Eurosceptic government group includes: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Germany.
7. Eurosceptic government group includes: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, and Poland.
8. In this analysis five EB surveys have been used for descriptive purposes: EB 81.2 (collected 15–24.3.2014), EB 83.3 (collected 16–27.5.2015), EB 85.2 (21–31.5.2016), EB 87.3 (20–30.5.2017) and EB 89.1 (13–28.3.2018). The EB surveys were all downloaded from GESIS Zacat.
9. The country-specific number is not included within the text but is available in the appendix.
10. Eurobarometer survey item: “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in...? The European Union.” Options: In the right direction, in the wrong direction, neither the one nor the other or don’t know. Showing proportion answering “in the right direction”. Don’t know answers excluded.

- 11.** Eurobarometer survey item: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. *The European Union.*” Options: ‘Tend to trust, tend not to trust or don’t know’”. Showing proportion of respondents answering “tend to trust”. Don’t know answers excluded.
- 12.** Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *(OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.*” Options: ‘Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know’”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.
- 13.** Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *More decisions should be taken at EU level.*” Options: ‘Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know’”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.
- 14.** Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *Globalisation is an opportunity for economic growth.*” Options: ‘Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know’”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.
- 15.** Eurobarometer survey item: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? *Immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY).*” Options: ‘Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know’”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.

Appendix

Table 1. Public support for the EU's current direction 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 88.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	27	23	15	28	32
Belgium	40	33	18	32	30
Bulgaria	58	63	43	56	55
Croatia	51	48	30	45	51
Cyprus	23	25	18	22	32
Czech Republic	37	36	19	25	32
Denmark	47	38	14	28	26
Estonia	55	42	20	34	35
Finland	34	39	25	45	38
France	23	19	12	38	29
Germany	36	31	13	32	35
Greece	16	12	6	15	20
Hungary	43	43	18	34	38
Ireland	47	54	43	52	64
Italy	18	28	19	24	32
Latvia	42	47	24	40	40
Lithuania	54	57	37	49	57
Luxembourg	43	27	12	40	36
Malta	52	41	36	46	41
Netherlands	51	35	20	37	39
Poland	51	42	23	40	54
Portugal	29	39	29	53	56
Romania	54	70	41	58	57
Slovakia	37	36	19	29	35
Slovenia	38	34	18	32	35
Spain	30	34	21	31	35
Sweden	48	27	16	30	32
United Kingdom	24	20	16	31	22

Table 2. Levels of trust in the European Parliament 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 88.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	48	48	44	50	56
Belgium	57	59	55	58	60
Bulgaria	60	66	60	62	65
Croatia	48	61	56	53	56
Cyprus	37	36	37	43	57
Czech Republic	38	47	36	36	45
Denmark	63	70	61	66	74
Estonia	68	72	66	68	76
Finland	62	71	64	69	72
France	41	46	45	48	51
Germany	50	54	47	59	65
Greece	34	31	24	29	40
Hungary	56	65	54	58	60
Ireland	47	59	60	64	74
Italy	41	53	46	52	56
Latvia	48	58	56	55	61
Lithuania	70	77	69	75	78
Luxembourg	61	68	66	71	77
Malta	74	77	69	77	67
Netherlands	54	58	54	60	66
Poland	53	63	57	56	59
Portugal	34	47	45	57	66
Romania	60	71	58	61	67
Slovakia	40	57	43	47	54
Slovenia	40	45	37	41	46
Spain	21	36	37	39	47
Sweden	61	67	64	69	77
United Kingdom	27	35	35	42	42

Table 3. Public support for leaving the EU 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 83.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	44	46	49	48	46
Belgium	29	27	27	30	36
Bulgaria	27	39	33	32	32
Croatia	44	41	45	45	43
Czech Republic	47	35	47	44	39
Denmark	26	23	21	16	16
Estonia	23	21	25	21	20
Finland	30	27	31	24	28
France	34	28	31	28	31
Germany	27	24	27	19	16
Greece	43	42	48	42	37
Hungary	38	36	37	33	38
Ireland	29	30	29	27	26
Italy	45	41	49	49	46
Latvia	38	33	36	33	32
Lithuania	24	21	28	26	22
Luxembourg	22	23	24	24	19
Malta	26	20	24	18	22
Poland	39	45	42	38	40
Portugal	43	36	41	33	25
Republic of Cyprus	53	50	50	48	35
Romania	31	40	42	39	40
Slovakia	32	28	36	30	34
Slovenia	47	51	57	50	46
Spain	30	30	30	24	28
Sweden	39	30	27	26	27
The Netherlands	22	17	19	14	13
United Kingdom	53	50	54	54	50

Table 4. Public support for deeper European integration 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 88.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	33	36	36	40	43
Belgium	66	69	70	70	69
Bulgaria	63	69	62	64	67
Croatia	52	70	68	60	65
Czech Republic	48	46	40	36	37
Denmark	19	31	30	33	31
Estonia	35	58	52	50	47
Finland	24	31	33	36	32
France	55	67	69	65	64
Germany	36	49	53	57	64
Greece	44	48	43	51	55
Hungary	59	63	54	51	55
Ireland	37	49	53	55	64
Italy	55	73	67	68	64
Latvia	47	65	61	60	64
Lithuania	59	72	64	65	70
Luxembourg	63	67	72	69	73
Malta	53	65	60	69	69
Poland	60	70	59	59	65
Portugal	73	72	63	69	75
Republic of Cyprus	50	72	71	82	87
Romania	69	82	69	69	70
Slovakia	51	54	48	49	47
Slovenia	63	60	62	59	68
Spain	75	81	80	85	86
Sweden	19	27	26	26	27
The Netherlands	37	55	51	56	53
United Kingdom	27	35	37	42	45

Table 5. Public support for globalisation 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 88.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	60	55	55	58	63
Belgium	60	60	59	66	65
Bulgaria	64	71	70	65	67
Croatia	65	71	64	69	66
Czech Republic	46	52	49	50	49
Denmark	79	85	85	89	87
Estonia	64	72	69	66	69
Finland	76	79	76	82	79
France	44	53	57	61	56
Germany	74	78	75	80	82
Greece	31	32	29	31	33
Hungary	63	71	63	67	72
Ireland	71	82	78	83	84
Italy	39	61	63	55	54
Latvia	61	69	69	67	66
Lithuania	70	80	79	77	78
Luxembourg	61	65	64	71	70
Malta	85	86	89	93	79
Poland	67	74	68	71	75
Portugal	51	67	77	84	86
Republic of Cyprus	35	42	48	45	48
Romania	58	67	58	55	57
Slovakia	54	60	58	58	56
Slovenia	61	71	66	66	73
Spain	55	65	65	68	70
Sweden	78	84	85	87	86
The Netherlands	78	83	77	81	81
United Kingdom	66	73	75	79	76

Table 6. Public support for immigration 2014-2018.

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<i>Country</i>	<i>EB 81.2</i>	<i>EB 88.3</i>	<i>EB 85.2</i>	<i>EB 87.3</i>	<i>EB 89.1</i>
Austria	45	47	51	53	59
Belgium	44	43	34	48	43
Bulgaria	17	25	16	18	18
Croatia	24	33	23	20	27
Czech Republic	18	14	11	15	15
Denmark	58	55	44	48	54
Estonia	22	13	13	11	13
Finland	70	63	53	62	61
France	47	48	43	49	45
Germany	59	58	45	56	56
Greece	38	29	22	27	25
Hungary	27	27	13	13	16
Ireland	62	69	73	84	82
Italy	37	33	32	37	38
Latvia	22	14	8	9	9
Lithuania	45	32	26	33	34
Luxembourg	80	80	78	79	82
Malta	22	30	35	50	48
Poland	45	41	31	32	42
Portugal	68	77	70	70	74
Republic of Cyprus	30	27	26	41	33
Romania	55	65	34	41	40
Slovakia	20	19	11	15	21
Slovenia	42	33	25	33	30
Spain	51	63	55	63	66
Sweden	91	91	83	87	85
The Netherlands	61	56	48	55	56
United Kingdom	68	69	68	83	77

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^{vii} Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland.

^{viii} In this article five EB surveys have been used: EB 81.2 (collected 15–24.3.2014), EB 83.3 (collected 16 – 27.5.2015), EB 85.2 (21–31.5.2016), EB 87.3 (20–30.5.2017) and EB 89.1 (13–28.3.2018). The EB surveys were downloaded from GESIS Zucat.

^{ix} The country-specific number is not included within the text, but is available in the appendix.

^x Eurobarometer survey item: “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in...? The European Union.” Options: In the right direction, in the wrong direction, neither the one nor the other or don’t know. Showing proportion answering “in the right direction”. Don’t know answers excluded.

^{xi} Eurobarometer survey item: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. *The European Union.*” Options: Tend to trust, tend not to trust or don’t know”. Showing proportion of respondents answering “tend to trust”. Don’t know answers excluded.

^{xii} Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *(OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.*” Options: Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.

^{xiii} Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *More decisions should be taken at EU level.*” Options: Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.

^{xiv} Eurobarometer survey item: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statement: *Globalisation is an opportunity for economic growth.*” Options: Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.

^{xv} Eurobarometer survey item: To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? *Immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY).*” Options: Totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree or don’t know”. Showing proportion answering totally agree or tend to agree. Don’t know answers excluded.